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Abstract 
This study examines auditors who monopolize audit markets (monopolist auditors), 
defined as a particular industry within a city (Numan and Willekens 2012), and their 
pricing strategy as well as audit quality. I document that monopolist auditors charge lower 
fees than industry specialist auditors, suggesting that monopolist auditors discount audit 
fees to deter new entrants. This result is consistent with monopolists using a limit pricing 
strategy (Milgrom and Roberts 1982) but contrasts with regulators’ concerns about 
monopoly pricing. I also find that the monopolist auditors more frequently fail to detect 
misstatements than industry specialist auditors that do not have monopolies. This is 
consistent with regulators’ concerns about market-dominating auditors’ complacency 
(GAO 2003, 2008). In cross-sectional tests, I document that the limit pricing is 
predominantly evident among clients in homogenous operation industries, where the 
monopolist auditors would fear more for new entrants because the monopolist auditors 
would forgo more profits generated from clients in homogeneous operation industries. 
On the other hand, I find that the limit pricing is less evident among clients in industries 
requiring complex accounting where the monopolist auditors would have less fear for 
new entrants because barriers to entry are high in industries with complex accounting. 
Finally, I find that monopolist auditors’ audit failures are more pronounced when market 
competition within a city is low, where the monopolist auditors would have even lower 
incentives to improve audit quality.
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to provide a new perspective on the effect of audit 
market concentration on audit fees and audit quality by examining an extreme proxy for 
audit market concentration. The study is motivated by regulators’ concerns over the effect 
of audit market concentration on audit fees and quality, for empirical studies have been 
inconclusive (DeFond and Zhang 2014). In particular, this study addresses the research 
question by examining auditors having 100% market share relative to industry specialist 
auditors within a city and industry market.  
There is a long-standing concern that audit market concentration harms investors 
and other users of financial statements. The audit market has been dominated since the 
1970s by increasingly fewer audit firms because of mergers and/or the demise of audit 
firms such as Arthur Andersen. The number of audit firms large enough to provide audit 
services to the country’s largest organizations in the U.S. has decreased from eight (1973 
– 1989) to six (1990 – 1998) to five (1999 – 2002) and to four (2003 – today). Since then, 
there has been considerable concern that this number may shrink even more (New York 
Times 2005).1 During this period, the remaining four audit firms’ market shares have not 
changed significantly. The Government Accountability Office (GAO 2008) reports that 
the largest four audit firms (Big 4 audit firms) continue to service approximately 92 
percent of the largest public companies in the U.S., suggesting that these companies have 
                                                 
1 In 2005, KPMG (one of the largest four audit firms) was convicted of servicing illegal tax shelters to its 
clients; however, the U.S. Justice Department did not drive the case to criminal prosecution.  Arguably, the 
reason for this was regulators’ concern that the demise of KPMG would intensify audit market 
concentration from Big 4 to Big 3 audit firms (Allen et al. 2012).   
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nowhere else to go.2 Consequently, regulators have expressed concerns that the Big 4 
audit firms monopolize the audit market as a group, raising specific concerns of monopoly 
audit pricing and low audit quality due to auditors’ complacency (GAO 2003, 2008; U.S. 
Treasury 2008). 
In a similar vein, the press expresses its concern on the issue: “… Are auditors 
becoming too big to fail? For over a decade, there have been articles and op-eds in the 
popular and business press arguing that the auditing industry… is a tightening oligopoly, 
increasingly insulated from the risks of failure” (Forbes 2013). Notwithstanding these 
concerns, research has shown mixed results (e.g., GAO 2003, 2008; DeFond and Zhang 
2014) regarding the impact of audit market concentration on audit pricing and audit 
quality. I address this issue by examining two specific research issues. First, how do audit-
firm monopolies affect audit fees? And second, how do audit-firm monopolies affect 
audit quality? In particular, rather than examining monopoly concerns about Big 4 audit 
firms as a group in the U.S., this study focuses on audit fees and audit quality of each 
audit office that monopolizes specific city-industry audit markets. Stated formally, how 
do monopolist auditors in a city-industry audit market affect audit fees and audit quality? 
3 
An innovation in the current study is the identification of monopolist auditors in 
city-industry audit markets as proxies for extreme cases of audit market concentration 
                                                 
2 The statistic on large accelerated filers is based on Audit Analytics (2014). For smaller filers, Big 4 audit 
firms serve 63 percent of accelerated filers, and 64 percent of non-accelerated filers. 
3 Although I define auditors having 100% market share in a city-industry audit market as monopolist 
auditors, strictly speaking, they are quasi-monopolists. This is because a monopoly in this setting does not 
represent a natural monopoly (such as utility companies that have a guaranteed monopoly by regulation). 
In other words, clients have other available but costly options in selecting auditors. 
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(where the city is defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area, or MSA).4 Most previous 
studies address the issue of audit market concentration using either a concentration 
measure like the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Kallapur et al. 2010; Newton et al. 2013; 
Boone et al. 2012; Francis et al. 2013a; Bandyopadhyay and Kao 2004) or a market share 
equality measure like the Gini index (Quick and Wolz 1999; Abidin et al. 2008; Dunn et 
al. 2011, 2013). Rather than relying on these proxies, I focus on the auditors monopolizing 
their audit market, which directly capture audit market concentration. In support of the 
city-industry level as a unit of audit market competition, the spatial competition model 
by Hotelling (1929) assumes that competitive pressure most likely comes from an 
incumbent’s closest competitor.5 Thus, the city-industry level turns out to be a practical 
measurement unit of audit market competition, since the city-industry audit market is 
closely reflective of the market with immediate competition.  
Interestingly, the identification of a monopolist auditor primarily relies on the 
auditor industry specialization literature. The industry specialist auditors in a city market 
are typically measured as audit offices having more than a certain threshold of market 
share within a specific city-industry market [e.g., 50% based on Reichelt and Wang 
(2010) and Bills et al. (2015)]. However, no study further examines the effects of industry 
                                                 
4 Throughout this paper, I define “city” as a MSA. MSAs are identified from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
MSA cross-map, which is available at http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/def.html 
5 Viewing the city-industry audit market as a competition unit is also supported by Numan and Willekens 
(2012), who adopt the spatial competition model in audit markets to examine the effects of spatial 
competition on audit pricing.  Their study measures the spatial competition in a city-industry audit market.  
Furthermore, recent research has suggested that audit markets and audit-firm behavior are more 
appropriately examined at the local level. In particular, Wallman (1996) and Francis et al. (1999) argue that 
Big 4 audit firms are decentralized organizations and operate through a network of semi-autonomous 
practice offices, suggesting that local offices contract with clients, administer audit engagements, and issue 
audit reports signed on the local office letterhead.  Moreover, Francis et al. (1999), and Francis and Yu 
(2009) support the notion that audit quality is systematically different by audit offices. 
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specialist auditors on audit fees and audit quality when their market share reaches 100% 
within the city-industry market.  
Examining the industry specialist auditors having 100% market share (i.e., 
monopolist auditors) contributes to literature in audit market competition and auditor 
industry specialization in two ways. First, it allows the examination of auditors’ 
incentives when they achieve monopoly power, which is rarely observable in the national 
audit market.6 When industry specialist auditors’ market share is 100%, they are likely to 
have different incentives than industry specialist auditors having less than 100% market 
share. Specifically, industry specialist auditors with 100% market share find themselves 
in a quasi-monopoly setting because it removes competition within the city-industry audit 
market, thereby creating barriers to entry (e.g., investment to set up a quality-
differentiated service) for other auditors.7 Second, and more importantly, examining 
industry specialist auditors with 100% market share allows an analysis that resolves an 
empirical issue underlying the relation between industry specialization and audit market 
concentration. Specifically, the issue is that the effects of industry specialization and 
market concentration on audit pricing (or audit quality) are not separable, because the 
product-differentiation strategy adopted by industry specialist auditors brings them a 
bigger market share, intensifying their own market concentration. This study attempts to 
disentangle those two effects by exploiting the fact that the monopolist auditors are a 
subgroup of industry specialist auditors. In particular, I include a variable indicating 
                                                 
6 Although an audit market is characterized as an oligopoly, a monopoly is clearly a different form of 
competition. 
7 If only one client exists in a city-industry audit market, the monopolist auditor may be misidentified 
because barriers to entry do not likely exist in such a monopolistic environment. Therefore, monopolist 
auditors are identified only when at least two clients exist in the city-industry audit market. 
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industry specialist auditors along with the variable indicating monopolist auditors in my 
regressions, and I focus on the incremental effect of monopolist auditors on audit fees 
(and audit quality) relative to the effect of industry specialization. In this way, I parse out 
the effect of monopolist auditors on audit fees (and audit quality) from the effect of 
industry specialization.  
When industry specialist auditors become quasi-monopolists, I predict that audit 
fees may be affected in one of two ways. First, the monopoly pricing hypothesis predicts 
monopolist auditors will charge higher audit fees than industry specialist auditors (Bain 
1951; Tirole 1988; Feldman 2006). This is consistent with monopolists’ rent extracting 
incentives. Alternatively, the limit pricing hypothesis argues that monopolists are 
unlikely to charge monopoly prices, rather, they are likely to set a low price to signal to 
potential competitors a low market profitability (Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Klemperer 
1989). In other words, monopolists may charge a low price as a deterrent to entry. This 
leads to a prediction that monopolist auditors reduce the audit fee premiums they 
normally would charge as industry specialists. Given two different theoretical 
predictions, the effect of monopolist auditors on audit fees is an open empirical question. 
Regarding audit quality, when industry specialist auditors become quasi-
monopolist, audit quality may also be affected in one of two ways. First, in a concentrated 
market, auditors may lose incentives to provide high audit quality because they would 
feel no need to differentiate themselves as they would in a competitive market place 
(GAO 2003; U.S. Treasury 2008). This complacency hypothesis implies that monopolist 
auditors would provide lower audit quality than industry specialist auditors. In contrast, 
an increase in audit market concentration could lead auditors to become more 
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independent from their clients’ threat of auditor switching (Chaney et al. 2003; Kallapur 
et al. 2010; Newton et al. 2013; Dunn et al. 2013). Such a hypothesis suggests that the 
monopolist auditors might provide higher audit quality than that of industry specialist 
auditors. In sum, based on two alternative predictions, the effect of monopolist auditors 
on audit quality is ex ante unclear. 
Using 20,333 observations for audit fees analysis, and 19,452 observations for 
audit quality analysis over the sample period of 2004-2013, I find that monopolist 
auditors charge lower fees than industry specialist auditors, contrary to regulators’ 
concerns about monopoly pricing, but consistent with limit pricing theory (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1982). Regarding audit quality, I find that monopolist auditors are more likely to 
fail to detect misstatements than industry specialist auditors, consistent with complacency 
hypothesis, confirming regulators’ concerns about dominant auditors’ low incentives to 
provide high audit quality (GAO 2003, 2008).  
In cross-sectional tests for limit pricing, I examine factors affecting future 
competitive pressure that monopolist auditors would confront because monopolists 
exhibit limit pricing in fear of facing new entrants in the future (Milgrom and Roberts 
1982). In particular, I find that the observed limit pricing is more pronounced for clients 
in homogenous operation industries where the monopolist auditors are expected to forego 
larger profits if new entrants enter the market. I also find that limit pricing is less 
pronounced for clients in industries requiring complex accounting, which provide high 
barriers to entry, thus reducing monopolist auditors’ concerns of losing future profits to 
new entrants.  
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In cross-sectional tests for complacency hypothesis, I examine a factor affecting 
the current competitive pressure that monopolist auditors might feel. I find that 
monopolist auditors’ failure to detect misstatements is more likely when current MSA-
level competition is low, consistent with monopolist auditors being more complacent in 
less competitive local markets. Additionally, I examine whether the effect of monopolist 
auditors on audit fees simply captures their economies of scale. I find that the limit pricing 
holds in various subsamples of audit firms having high and low numbers of clients within 
city-industry markets. Thus, I conclude that the monopolist auditors’ limit pricing 
strategy does not simply reflect their economies of scale.  
Finally, I use a path analysis to provide evidence on the existence and relative 
importance of the direct and indirect paths between monopolist auditors, audit fees, and 
audit quality. Market concentration might affect audit effort (proxied by audit fees), and 
consequently, audit quality [Huang et al. 2015]. I find that monopolist auditors lead to 
more misstatements not only directly, confirming the complacency hypothesis, but also 
indirectly via the reduced audit fees that monopolist auditors charge.  
The current study has significant policy implications. In general, regulators 
perceive that high audit market concentration is undesirable due to anti-competitive 
concerns (GAO 2003, 2008; U.S. Treasury 2008), yet they perceive auditors’ industry 
specialization as desirable based on the expectation of higher audit quality (PCAOB 
2013). However, when industry specialist auditors become monopolist auditors, 
regulators’ perspectives on audit markets are mixed. Specifically, this study enhances 
regulators’ understanding of differential effects of auditors’ industry expertise and market 
concentration on audit pricing strategy and audit quality. For instance, when industry 
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specialist auditors capture 100% market share within a city-industry market, their pricing 
strategy exhibits limit pricing, one form of anti-competitive behavior. Thus, this study 
prompts regulators’ careful evaluation of industry specialization in a city-industry audit 
market. For the same reasons, this study could be informative to companies when 
selecting auditors.  
In addition, the current study contributes to the existing auditing literature in 
various ways. First, it contributes to the audit market concentration literature. DeFond 
and Zhang (2014) and GAO (2003, 2008) call for further research by pointing out that 
the impact of audit market concentration on audit fees and audit quality is an unresolved 
issue. Their call largely stems from conflicting empirical findings on the effect of audit 
market concentration on both audit fees and audit quality. By examining the effect of 
monopolist auditors on audit fees and audit quality beyond the effect on those of industry 
specialists, this study provides a new perspective about the role of audit market 
concentration. Second, this study contributes to the auditor industry specialization 
literature. As mentioned earlier, monopolist auditors are defined as an extreme case (i.e., 
a subset) of industry specialist auditors. Thus, by investigating monopolist auditors’ 
incremental or moderating effects on audit fees and audit quality relative to industry 
specialist auditors, this study provides deeper understanding of the role of auditors’ 
industry specialization in a city market. 
9 
Chapter 2: Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1. Prior Literature in Audit Market Concentration and Auditor Industry 
Specialization 
Prior literature on audit market concentration shows mixed findings in its effect 
on audit fees. On the one hand, many studies (Carson et al. 2012; Feldman 2006; Dunn 
et al. 2013) address the negative effect of audit market concentration on audit fees. Carson 
et al. (2012) argue that the Big N’s audit fee premium is conditional on the competitive 
pressure that Big N audit firms feel, and examine the change in Big N’s audit fee premium 
as the number of Big N audit firms shrinks (i.e., Big 6 era, Big 5 era, and Big 4 era) in 
the Australian setting. Also, Feldman (2006) exploits the demise of Arthur Andersen as 
an exogenous shock, and examines the effect of changes in market concentration using 
the Herfindahl index from 2001 to 2002 on audit fees charged by Big N. Acknowledging 
that the audit market is already highly concentrated by Big 4 audit firms, Dunn et al. 
(2013) adopt Big 4’s market share equality based on the argument that their selected 
measure (the Gini index) better captures the competitive pressure than the traditional 
market concentration index (the Herfindahl index).8 These studies find that audit fees 
increase as Big N audit firms’ market shares increase, consistent with monopoly pricing 
of Big 4 audit firms as a group. 
On the other hand, a number of studies (Simunic 1980; Bandyopadhyay and Kao 
2004; and GAO 2008) do not find such pricing behavior (i.e., no differences in fees). 
                                                 
8 For a similar reason, Dunn et al. (2011) and Abidin et al. (2008) argue that the Gini index captures 
competitive pressure better than the Herfindahl index. 
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Simunic (1980) examines Big 8 audit firms as a group, but fails to find that Big 8 firms 
charge monopoly prices. Using the Herfindahl index in Canada’s municipal audit market, 
Bandyopadhyay and Kao (2004) find that audit market concentration is unrelated to Big 
6 audit fees, although they find a positive relation between concentration and non-Big 6 
audit fees. In addition, using the Herfindahl index, GAO (2008) fails to find that industry 
concentration in the audit market is associated with audit fees. However, the GAO (2008) 
study raises concerns that the Herfindahl index is not a perfect measure to capture 
auditors’ competitive pressure, and the effect of audit market concentration is confounded 
by the effect of auditor industry specialization. I attempt to address those issues in this 
study.  
Similarly, the effect of audit market concentration on audit quality is inconclusive. 
Several studies have found a positive effect on audit quality. In particular, both Kallapur 
et al. (2010) and Newton et al. (2013) examine audit market concentration in MSAs 
measured using the Herfindahl index, but using different proxies for audit quality: 
discretionary accruals and likelihood of restatements, respectively. They conclude that 
there is a positive association between audit market concentration and audit quality. These 
findings are consistent with the idea that auditors in a concentrated market are more 
independent from clients’ influence, and thus provide higher audit quality.  
In contrast, several studies report opposite findings. Using Big 4’s market share 
equality measure, Dunn et al. (2013) find that audit quality measured as the likelihood of 
restatements increases as the auditors’ market share is more equally distributed. Also, 
Boone et al. (2012) find that audit market concentration in MSAs as measured by the 
Herfindahl index is negatively associated with audit quality, proxied by a likelihood of 
11 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. The findings of these two studies are consistent 
with the idea that auditors in a concentrated market do not have enough incentives to 
provide high audit quality, and thus become complacent (or entrenched). Interestingly, 
Francis et al. (2013a) find both positive and negative associations between audit quality 
and audit market concentration. They examine cross-national variations in audit market 
concentration, and audit quality proxies such as accruals, and the likelihood of reporting 
losses and timely losses. Their findings are that, overall, Big 4 market share concentration 
at the country-industry level is associated with higher audit quality, while the market 
concentration (measured as the Herfindahl index) within Big 4 group of audit firms is 
negatively associated with audit quality. Overall, the mixed findings in the prior literature 
on the effect of audit market concentration on audit quality as well as on audit fees warrant 
a new approach to address the issue. My study attempts to provide a bright-line 
conclusion of the issue by examining monopolist auditors as a proxy for an extreme case 
of audit market concentration which, to the best of my knowledge, has not been discussed 
previously. 
Unlike the mixed results in the audit market concentration literature, the effect of 
industry specialist auditors on audit fees and audit quality is relatively straightforward. 
Specifically, to the extent that firms’ accounting systems and policies are industry-
specific rather than generic, auditors’ industry-specific knowledge would function as a 
differentiated service (Craswell et al. 1995). Such differentiated services would indicate 
the auditors’ higher competencies, heightening their reputational capital at stake. Thus, 
industry specialist auditors’ high competencies and incentives would lead them not only 
to provide high audit quality but also to charge high audit fees. Empirical findings in 
12 
numerous studies support these arguments. One set of studies (Craswell et al. 1995; 
Ferguson et al. 2003) finds audit fee premiums when auditors are industry specialists in 
an Australian setting, and another set of studies (Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Francis et 
al. 2005; Numan and Willekens 2012; Fung et al. 2012) finds that the industry specialist 
auditors charge fee premiums in a U.S. setting. Among those studies, Ferguson et al. 
(2003), Francis et al. (2005), and Numan and Willekens (2012) emphasize city-level 
industry specialization by reporting robust fee premiums for city-level industry 
specialists, compared to national-level industry specialists. On the other hand, industry 
specialist auditors appear to provide high audit quality using multiple audit quality 
proxies: lower absolute discretionary accruals (Reichelt and Wang 2010), higher 
likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions (Reichelt and Wang 2010), lower analysts’ 
forecast error/dispersion (Payne 2008; Xie et al. 2012), lower likelihood of meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Payne 2008), and lower cost of debt 
(Li et al. 2010).9 
 
2.2. Relation between Industry Specialization and Audit Market Concentration 
As will be explained in a later section, I adopt the market share approach in 
defining industry specialist auditors and in defining monopolist auditors.10 However, this 
approach brings into play an endogenous relation between industry specialization and 
audit market concentration. Specifically, industry specialization and market power from 
                                                 
9 Relevant to my study, several studies (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Xie et al. 2012; Li et al. 2010) find city-
industry specialist auditors provide higher audit quality. 
10 Although industry expertise cannot be observed directly, prior research suggests that audit firms’ market 
share is a reasonable proxy because “audit firms develop industry expertise through serving clients in the 
same industry and sharing experience and knowledge across clients” (Ferguson et al. 2003).  
13 
high market share are not easily separable because those two characteristics are present 
at the same time. In support of this view, GAO (2008, p. 111) affirms the difficulty of 
distinguishing those two characteristics by stating “accounting firms holding a larger 
market share of the industry in which the public company operates are found to charge 
higher fees but this leaves open the question as to whether the empirical evidence is 
supportive of expertise-quality-differentiated services or anticompetitive pricing. 
Unfortunately, these are extremely difficult issues to address in a rigorous and 
comprehensive manner…” Despite the lack of resolution of the issue, it has been largely 
ignored in the auditing literature (Numan and Willekens 2012).  
A seminal paper by Simunic (1980) assumes audit markets are perfectly 
competitive within pools of similarly-sized clients, and attributes any audit fee premium 
to the higher audit quality. Since then, the literature in auditor industry specialization 
assumes that audit markets are competitive, and attributes the findings of positive 
association between industry specialist auditors and audit fees (or audit quality) to a fee 
premium (or high audit quality) driven by industry specialist auditors.11 Recently, Numan 
and Willekens (2012) attempted to address the endogenous issue between industry 
specialization and audit market concentration. They acknowledge that the audit market is 
realistically an oligopoly market rather than a perfectly competitive market. They adopt 
a spatial competition model (Hotelling 1929), and use an auditor’s market share distance 
from their closest competitor as a proxy for market competition, and an auditor’s market 
share distance to its client’s industry as a proxy for industry specialization. In their setting, 
they show that both industry specialization and market power, separately, lead to audit 
                                                 
11 Craswell et al. (1995) explicitly say the audit fee premium for industry specialization is based on the 
assumption of a competitive audit market (Numan and Willekens 2012). 
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fee premiums. My study attempts to distinguish the effect of audit market competition 
from the effect of industry specialization by examining monopolist auditors’ behavior 
relative to industry specialist auditors, which was not explored in the previous studies. 
 
2.3. Implications of Industry Specialist Auditors with 100% Market Share 
(Monopolist Auditors) 
The cost that must be incurred by a new entrant into a market where monopolist 
auditors exist is higher than that where industry specialist auditors exist. The rationale is 
as follows. By definition, monopolist auditors have no current competitors in their audit 
market, while industry specialist auditors do. This implies that competitors exist beyond 
the boundaries of monopolist auditors’ markets, while competitors exist within the market 
of industry specialist auditors. So, on the one hand, in order to poach industry specialist 
auditors’ clients, competitors (i.e., non-industry specialist auditors) would have to incur 
costs such as investment in additional resources to provide audit service quality similar 
to that of industry specialist auditors. On the other hand, in order to poach the monopolist 
auditors’ clients, competitors (located outside the monopolist auditors’ market) would 
have to incur costs in setting up a related practice,12 which is not trivial (O’Keefe et al. 
1994), in addition to costs associated with service differentiation. 
Furthermore, the monopoly power established via a barrier to entry could be 
maintained through clients’ limited choices of auditors other than the monopolist 
auditors. Such limitations arise because it is costly for clients to select alternative auditors 
rather than the monopolist auditors. Specifically, clients may have two alternative 
                                                 
12 Audit firms make significant investments in general knowledge, industry-specific knowledge, and client-
specific knowledge (O’Keefe et al. 1994). 
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choices.13 One is that clients might select an auditor who provides audit services in the 
same industry, but is located farther than their current auditors from their location (e.g., 
outside the clients’ MSA). However, such an option is costly, because when an auditor 
and its client operate in different local areas, information asymmetry between them could 
increase, resulting in higher contracting costs (Francis et al. 1999).14 Empirical evidence 
(Choi et al. 2008, 2012; Jensen et al. 2015) also suggests that geographic proximity 
between audit offices and clients is positively associated with audit fees and negatively 
associated with audit quality. Alternatively, clients may select an auditor who does not 
have industry specific knowledge, but resides in the same local area. However, such an 
option is also costly because the clients forego high audit quality by choosing non-
industry specialist auditors (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Li et al. 2010; Xie et al. 2012). In 
sum, these attributes are unique to monopolist auditors, and reinforce monopolist 
auditors’ market power. In the Results section 4.2, I examine whether these attributes are 
valid to explain monopolist auditors’ positions. 
 
2.4. Hypothesis Development 
When industry specialist auditors become monopolists, audit fees may be affected 
in one of two ways. First, consistent with regulators’ long-standing concern over auditors’ 
monopolistic power, monopolist auditors may be able to extract incrementally higher 
audit fees (“monopoly pricing hypothesis”) (Bain 1951; Tirole 1988; Feldman 2006) 
                                                 
13 Here, clients refer to either a brand new client who did not hire an auditor before or a continuing client 
with the monopolist auditor. 
14 Specifically, Francis et al. (1999) address clients’ demand services from local audit offices to lower 
contracting costs, which includes “costs of delivering the audit, client search costs, and client costs in 
monitoring quality of audit services.” 
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relative to those charged by industry specialist auditors. This hypothesis is consistent with 
the best-known monopolists’ pricing strategy: raising price above marginal cost without 
losing clients (Tirole 1988). Under such a scenario, regulators are concerned with social 
welfare loss arising from such behavior. In contrast, Milgrom and Roberts (1982) analyze 
monopolists’ signaling behavior, and conclude that in some cases, monopolists are 
unlikely to charge monopoly prices in order to deter potential competitors’ entries to the 
market (“limit pricing hypothesis”).15,16 Klemperer (1989) supports the monopolists’ 
limit pricing hypothesis even after considering the consumer’s switching costs, which is 
a more realistic setting in the audit market. Thus, under the limit pricing hypothesis, 
monopolist auditors are willing to lower their audit fees, in order to signal low 
profitability to potential entrants (i.e., other auditors who are deciding whether to enter 
the city-industry market or not).17 For this signal to be credible, monopolist auditors 
would charge a price lower than what industry specialist auditors charge. Since industry 
specialist auditors charge audit fees premium, if monopolist auditors charged a similar 
level of audit fees to that charged by industry specialist auditors, it would give potential 
entrants the false impression that it is profitable to enter the market. Although lower audit 
                                                 
15 Milgrom and Roberts (1982) argue that limit pricing depends upon incomplete information about firms’ 
costs.  Although audit fees data are publicly disclosed, these data reflect complete information about audit 
firms’ revenue, not costs. Therefore, the assumption of “incomplete information about firms’ costs” is not 
violated in an audit market setting.  Furthermore, even if in a setting with complete information about firms’ 
costs, Klemperer (1989) argues that incumbents exhibit limit pricing if switching costs exist. Considering 
that switching costs are prevalent in audit markets, his argument further validates limit pricing being a 
possible outcome in an audit market setting. 
16 Some may argue that in the face of entry threats from potential competitors, incumbent firms may charge 
a price equivalent to a marginal cost (i.e., competitive price).  This scenario works in contestable markets, 
which assume homogeneous product industry where no sunk cost exists, and no cost advantage over 
entrants exists (Tirole 1988).  Since audit service is not likely a homogenous product, I exclude the 
contestable markets as an explanation of monopolist auditors’ behavior. 
17 Actually, signaling to deter potential competitors has been frequently discussed in the accounting 
literature to explain companies financial reporting behavior. For instance, Darrough and Stoughton (1990) 
and Rogers and Stocken (2005) provide an analysis that companies are more likely to release bad news 
when they expect greater competition from potential new entrants. 
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fees would be costly to monopolist auditors by giving up additional rents, monopolist 
auditors would be willing to reduce the fees until the foregone rents become equal to or 
greater than losses arising from market shares lost to new entrants.  
In sum, under the monopoly pricing hypothesis, I expect monopolist auditors to 
charge higher audit fees than industry specialist auditors, while under the limit pricing 
hypothesis, I expect monopolist auditors to charge lower fees than industry specialist 
auditors. Figure 1 describes graphically both the monopoly pricing and limit pricing 
hypotheses. Considering these conflicting arguments, I hypothesize the effect of 
monopolist auditors on audit fees in non-directional form (Hypothesis 1) as well as the 
two competing alternative forms (Hypotheses 1a and 1b) as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: An audit firm with a monopoly on audit work in an MSA-industry 
does not affect audit fees. 
Hypothesis 1a (Monopoly pricing hypothesis): An audit firm with a 
monopoly on audit work in an MSA-industry charges higher fees relative to 
industry specialist auditors. 
Hypothesis 1b (Limit pricing hypothesis): An audit firm with a monopoly on 
audit work in an MSA-industry charges lower fees relative to industry 
specialist auditors. 
 
 Furthermore, when industry specialist auditors become monopolists, audit 
quality may also be affected in one of two ways. Per regulators’ concerns, audit market 
concentration might lead to a decrease in audit quality due to low incentives to provide 
high audit quality (“auditor complacency hypothesis”). The auditor complacency 
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hypothesis suggests that when there are no competitors, auditors no longer need to 
differentiate themselves as they would in a competitive marketplace (GAO 2003; U.S. 
Treasury 2008; Boone et al. 2012; Francis et al. 2013a). Francis et al. (2013a) examining 
market concentration at the country-industry level within Big 4 audit firms (as measured 
by the Herfindahl index), find that Big 4 audit firms in more concentrated markets exhibit 
lower audit quality. Alternatively, given the specifics of the audit market, a contrary 
theory predicts that audit market concentration might lead to higher audit quality. That is, 
an auditor with high market share would be less influenced by its clients’ switching threat, 
so that the auditors actually become more independent from their clients (“low switching 
risk hypothesis”) (Chaney et al. 2003; Kallapur et al. 2010; Newton et al. 2013; Dunn et 
al. 2013). In this study, I examine the likelihood of financial-statement restatement as an 
audit quality measure because restatements are viewed as the most obvious indication of 
audit failure representing low audit quality (Kinney et al. 2004; Newton et al. 2013; 
DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
In sum, if on average, the auditor complacency hypothesis explains monopolist 
auditors’ behavior, I would expect that monopolist auditors fail to detect misstatements 
more frequently than industry specialist auditors. In contrast, if on average, the low 
switching risk hypothesis explains monopolist auditors’ behavior, I would expect a 
negative association between monopolist auditors and the likelihood of restatements. 
Figure 2 describes graphically both the auditor complacency and low switching risk 
hypotheses. Because of the conflicting arguments, I hypothesize the effect of monopolist 
auditors on audit quality in non-directional form (Hypothesis 2) as well as the two 
competing alternative forms (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2: An audit firm with a monopoly on audit work in an MSA-industry 
does not affect audit quality. 
Hypothesis 2a (Auditor complacency hypothesis): An audit firm with a 
monopoly on audit work in an MSA-industry provides lower audit quality 
relative to industry specialist auditors. 
Hypothesis 2b (Low switching risk hypothesis): An audit firm with a 
monopoly on audit work in an MSA-industry provides higher audit quality 
relative to industry specialist auditors.
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Chapter 3: Sample and Research Design 
 
3.1. Sample Selection 
The sample period of this study is from 2004 to 2013. I use the year 2004 as a 
starting year because of a systematic change in financial reporting and the audit 
profession after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 (DeFond and Lennox 2011; 
Kaplan and Williams 2012).18 I cut off the sample in the year 2013 to allow for a sufficient 
time-lag between misstatements and announcement of restatements. Specifically, using 
restatements as a dependent variable requires allowing for a sufficient amount of time 
(approximately 2 years) until the subsequent restatements occur.19  
I merge Compustat with Audit Analytics by CIK. Then, I match a city of the 
particular audit office identified in Audit Analytics with a principal city listed in MSA 
data.20 Following Francis et al. (2005) and Reichelt and Wang (2010), I require a 
minimum of two clients per each city, industry and year combination to ensure that 
industry expertise is not determined by too few observations in a city-industry-fiscal year 
combination; and that monopolist auditors are not determined mechanically by only one 
client residing in a city-industry market.21 With these minimum procedures, I obtain 
                                                 
18 Another reason for choosing 2004 as a starting year is to include an indication of material weakness 
(SOX 404) or internal control deficiency disclosure (SOX 302) as a control variable. This was first 
implemented for 2004 financial statements, and is a critical determinant of both audit fees and restatements.  
19 Cheffers, Whalen, and Usvyatsky (2011) find the average time between an original financial statement 
and a subsequent restatement is about 700 days.  Thus, cutting off the sample in 2013 is reasonable, given 
that the most recent year (full 2015 calendar year) of data available at the time the data was collected for 
the current study. 
20 For 327 audit office cities that are not listed as principal cities in MSA data, I manually mapped those 
into MSA.  
21 The main results of this study are robust for 1) subsample that I require only two clients per each city, 
industry, and year combination; and 2) subsample that I require more than two clients per each city, 
industry, and year combination. Refer to Section 5.2 for more detail.  
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50,563 firm-year observations, from which I calculate each auditor’s market share in each 
city-industry market to identify monopolist auditors (MONO) and industry specialist 
auditors (SPEC). To obtain the final sample for audit fees analysis (and audit quality 
analysis) I delete firms that are missing values in estimating equation (1) (and equation 
(2)) and further delete firms that are in regulated industries. These procedures result in 
20,333 firm-year observations for audit fees analysis and 19,452 firm-year observations 
for audit quality analysis. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedures. 
 
3.2. Audit Fees Model 
To test H1, I estimate the following ordinary least square regression:  
 
LAFEEi,t = α0 + α1SPECi,t + α2 MONOi,t + βnControlsi,t + Ԑi,t. (1) 
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of audit fees (LAFEE).  First, to explain 
variables of interest, SPEC represents industry specialist auditors within a city market. I 
follow the market share approach (Neal and Riley 2004; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Lim 
and Tan 2008; Numan and Willekens 2012; Bills et al. 2015) to define industry specialist 
auditors. Specifically, based on a city defined as a MSA, I collect audit office information 
from Audit Analytics, map the city of the audit office into the MSA, and calculate the 
auditor’s market share (in terms of audit fees) within a two-digit SIC code within the 
MSA.22 If the calculated market share is greater than 50%, the auditor is indicated as an 
                                                 
22 Results of this study are not sensitive to three-digit NAICS (North American Industry Classification 
System) codes. 
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industry specialist auditor (SPEC).23 The variable of interest, MONO, represents 
monopolist auditors, and equals one if the auditor has 100% market share in a city-
industry market, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on SPEC (α1) captures the effect of 
industry specialist but non-monopolist auditors (i.e., industry specialists with market 
shares greater than 50% but less than 100%) on audit fees. The coefficient on MONO (α2) 
captures the incremental effect of monopolist auditors on audit fees relative to that of 
industry specialist but non-monopolist auditors. Under H1, if the monopoly pricing 
hypothesis (limit pricing hypothesis) is supported, I predict α2 to be positive (negative). 
Control variables consist of client-, auditor-, and engagement-specific factors, and 
are selected primarily from Simunic (1980) and Hay et al. (2006). Among client-related 
factors, the most influential determinant of audit fees is client size (SIZE). Also, whether 
clients are accelerated filers (AF) could be another proxy for client size. Since more 
complex operations require auditors to spend more time, I include proxies for complexity 
of a client’s operations: the number of business segments (NBUSSEG), the number of 
geographic segments (NFORGN), and the proportion of receivables and inventory 
(RECINV). Also, auditors charge a risk premium in the presence of a client’s financial 
risk (Simunic and Stein 1996). Thus, I include various performance measures such as 
ROA, LOSS, LEV, and LIQ to control for the effect of a client’s financial risk on audit 
fees. Since high growth firms demand more audit services (Reynolds et al. 2004), I 
include book-to-market ratio as a proxy for growth (BM). As engagement-specific factors, 
                                                 
23 The threshold of 50% is determined based on Neal and Riley (2004) and Reichelt and Wang (2010). Neal 
and Riley (2004) provide a formula to determine the threshold (1.2 * 1/N, where N is the number of 
auditors). Since the average number of auditors per city-industry market is 2.23, the calculated threshold is 
53%, which is roughly 50%. The results of this study do not change when I use 53% (exact threshold) or 
60% (another approximate threshold) as threshold. I also use alternative measures of industry specialization 
(e.g., market leader) discussed in Section 4.3.4. 
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audit issues may increase the risk premium or require additional effort, thus increasing 
audit fees (Knechel and Payne 2001). Thus, as proxies for audit issues, I include control 
variables related to audit opinion and report lag (GC, UO, ICWEAK, and 
LNREPORTLAG).  
In addition, auditors might discount fees when the engagement’s fiscal year-end 
is non-December 31, attributable to efficient resource allocation. Thus, DEC_YE is 
included to control for the effect of busy season on audit fees. Furthermore, because 
public exchange requires more complicated and frequent financial reporting, leading to 
more audit work, I include PUBLIC_EXC indicating public exchange. As auditor-specific 
factors, I include CHG_AUDID, indicating new auditor to control for a new auditor’s 
low-balling. I also include NSPECIALIST to control for the effect of national-level 
industry specialist auditors on audit fees (Mayhew and Wilkins 2003), and TENURE to 
control for an increase in efficiency as auditor tenure increases. Based on Choi et al. 
(2010), I also control for audit fees premium charged by large offices by including 
OFFICESIZE. To consider the higher audit fees charged by Big 4 audit firms, I include 
BIG4. Finally, year and industry fixed effects are included. 
Since audit office (at MSA level) is the level at which the variable of interest is 
calculated, standard errors are adjusted for within-cluster correlation where audit office 
and year comprise the cluster (Peterson 2009; Gow et al. 2010).24 Also, I winsorize each 
continuous variable at 1% and 99% to reduce the effect of extreme values.25 
                                                 
24 Inferences are unchanged when I instead cluster the standard errors by client (i.e., the coefficient on the 
test variables of interest have a sign and significance level that yields the same inferences as those reported 
in the paper). 
25 I apply the same scheme of clustering standard errors and winsorization to the rest of the estimations in 
this study.   
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3.3. Audit Quality Model 
The following logistic regression is estimated to examine the effect of the 
monopolist auditors on the likelihood of restatements:  
 
AQi,t = α0 + α1SPECi,t + α2 MONOi,t + βnControlsi,t + Ԑi,t. (2) 
 
As a dependent variable, I first create RESTATEMENT, which equals one if the 
financial statement is restated subsequently, and zero otherwise. Then, I create AQ as one 
minus RESTATEMENT, in order to interpret the coefficient on MONO consistent with 
H2. In other words, the dependent variable (AQ) equals one if the financial statement is 
not restated subsequently, and zero otherwise. Monopolist auditors (MONO) and industry 
specialist auditors (SPEC) are as defined earlier. Similar to the interpretation in audit fees 
analysis, the coefficient on SPEC (α1) captures the effect of industry specialist but non-
monopolist auditors (i.e., industry specialists with market shares greater than 50% but 
less than 100%) on the audit quality. Also, the coefficient on MONO (α2) captures the 
incremental effect of monopolist auditors on the audit quality relative to that of industry 
specialist but non-monopolist auditors. Under H2, if the auditor complacency hypothesis 
(low switching hypothesis) is supported, the coefficient on MONO is expected to be 
negative (positive). 
Control variables are selected primarily from Lennox and Li (2014), Lobo and 
Zhao (2013), and Francis et al. (2013b). The first control variable is client size (SIZE) 
because larger firms may have more resources in financial reporting. To consider 
complex accounting issues, I include an indication of merger and acquisition (MA). To 
25 
consider the effect of growing firms’ incentives to keep meeting a market’s expectations 
(Skinner and Sloan 2002), I include proxies for growth: book-to-market ratio (BM) and 
sales growth (GROWTH). Since companies reporting losses are more likely to restate 
(Kinney and McDaniel 1989; Hennes et al. 2008) their financial statements later, I include 
an indication of loss companies (LOSS). Also, companies that are highly leveraged may 
face pressures to manipulate financial statements, thus I include a leverage variable 
(LEV). Since whether clients are traded on a stock exchange could affect financial 
reporting quality (Lennox and Li 2014), I include the related variable (PUBLIC_EXC). 
In order to capture clients’ market-related incentives that could affect financial reporting 
quality, I include the magnitude of new capital raises (FIN), and a proxy for demand for 
external financing (EXTFIND). Also, to capture any effects of a firm’s life cycle on the 
likelihood of restatement, I include the related variable for a firm’s age (LNAGE). In 
addition, since high working capital accruals may work as vehicles to manipulate earnings 
(Richardson et al. 2005), I include two proxies for sufficiency of working capital accruals: 
changes in accounts receivables (DREC) and current accruals (CACCR). 
Next, I include auditor-related (or engagement-related) factors that might affect 
restatements. First, I control for audit office size (OFFICESIZE) because Francis and Yu 
(2009) and Francis et al. (2013b) find larger offices deliver higher audit quality. Also, I 
include a national-level industry expertise variable (NSPECIALIST) because industry 
leaders yield better audit quality (Reichelt and Wang 2010). Since auditors’ short tenure 
might impair audit quality (Gul et al. 2009), I include TENURE. Along similar lines, 
auditors’ economic bond with their clients could affect auditors’ professional skepticism 
(Kinney et al. 2004), thus I include the level of non-audit fees (LNAFEE). Also, weak 
26 
internal controls are likely to lead auditors to fail to prevent or detect misstatements, 
increasing the likelihood of misstatements. Thus, I include a variable indicating internal 
control deficiencies (ICWEAK). Furthermore, as Newton et al. (2013) find the audit 
market competition at the MSA-level could lead to higher likelihood of misstatements, I 
include a proxy for audit market competition (AUD_COMP). To account for differences 
in incentives and competencies provided by Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms, I include 
BIG4.  
Financial statements tend to be misstated for multiple consecutive years 
(Palmrose et al. 2004; Lennox and Li 2014), thus I control for persistency in restatements 
by including a lagged measure of restatements (LAGREST). Finally, I include year and 
industry fixed effects.
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A in Table 2 presents the mean and standard deviation of industry specialist 
(SPEC) and monopolist auditors (MONO) for the audit fees sample and the audit quality 
sample. The mean of SPEC is 0.27 (0.29) for the audit fees (audit quality) sample, while 
the mean of MONO is 0.03 (0.04) for the audit fees (audit quality) sample. These statistics 
suggest approximately 12% of industry specialist auditors are monopolist auditors.  
Panel B in Table 2 reports the distribution of SPEC and MONO by Big 4 and non-
Big 4 audit firms. For the audit fees sample, the distribution of monopolist auditors across 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms (20.0% for PWC, 29.4% for EY, 16.3% for DT, 12.0% 
for KPMG, and 22.4% for non-Big 4 audit firms) is similar to that of industry specialist 
auditors (25.8% for PWC, 36.1% for EY, 15.8% for DT, 11.9% for KPMG, and 10.5% 
for non-Big 4 audit firms), except for the relatively higher frequency of monopolist 
auditors observed for non-Big 4 auditors. A similar pattern is observed for the audit 
quality sample.26  
Panel C (Panel D) in Table 2 provides the distribution of SPEC and MONO by 
industry (MSA). In both panels, columns (1) and (2) [columns (3) and (4)] report the 
distribution of SPEC and MONO for the audit fees (audit quality) sample, respectively. 
According to Panel C, industry specialist and monopolist auditors are distributed over a 
                                                 
26 Since both industry specialist and monopolist auditors are concentrated among Big 4 audit firms, the 
confounding effect of Big 4 auditors’ reputation and litigation concerns on audit fees and audit quality 
might bias the coefficient on SPEC and MONO. Thus, in the robustness test section (section 4.3), I address 
this concern by examining H1 and H2 on two subsamples: Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms, separately. 
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wide range of industries, although there is some clustering in certain industries.27 For both 
audit fees and quality samples, it is notable that the frequency (%) of monopolist auditors 
by industry is not necessarily aligned with that of industry specialist auditors. For 
example, while only 1.1% (1.2%) of industry specialist auditors are observed in the coal 
mining industry in the audit fees (audit quality) sample, 6.2% (5.5%) of monopolist 
auditors are observed in the same industry. These findings suggest that monopolist 
auditors may have different incentives than industry specialist auditors. According to 
Panel D, industry specialist and monopolist auditors are distributed over a broad cross-
section of different MSAs, and no significant clustering in any MSAs is observed. 
Panel A and Panel B in Table 3 report the descriptive statistics for the variables 
in equation (1) and equation (2), respectively. In Panel A, the mean of the dependent 
variable (LAFEE) for the audit fees analysis is 13.36, which translates into average audit 
fees of approximately $0.63 million, and the average client size is approximately $186.8 
million. In addition, based on Panel B, the dependent variable (RESTATEMENT) has a 
mean of 0.12, meaning 2,334 firm-year observations are associated with restatements, 
comparable to the mean restatement of 0.11 as reported in Francis et al. (2013b).28 
Panel C (Panel D) in Table 3 presents the means of dependent and control variables for 
the audit fees sample (audit quality sample) by three sub-groups: non-industry specialist 
auditors in column (1), non-monopolist industry specialist auditors in column (2), and 
monopolist auditors in column (3). In Panel C, the mean of LAFEE is higher for non-
                                                 
27 Over 27% (26%) of SPEC is concentrated on chemical products manufacturing and business service 
industries in the audit fees (audit quality) sample. In addition, over 18% (16%) of MONO is concentrated 
on health service and paper products manufacturing industries in the audit fees (audit quality) sample. 
Findings in the main analysis (Table 5) are robust to the sample excluding these industries individually. 
28 Although I use AQ (= 1- RESTATEMENT) as a dependent variable to improve ease of interpretation, I 
use RESTATEMENT in explaining descriptive statistics for the same reason. 
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monopolist industry specialist auditors than non-industry specialist auditors, and the 
difference is significant (t-stat = 54.2) as reported in column (4). The mean of LAFEE is 
lower for monopolist auditors than non-monopolist industry specialist auditors, and the 
difference is significant (t-stat = –9.2) as reported in column (5). This bivariate test 
provides preliminary evidence supporting H1b, the limit pricing hypothesis. Panel D 
shows that the mean value of RESTATEMENT is higher for non-monopolist industry 
specialist auditors than non-industry specialist auditors, and this difference is significant 
(t-stat = 4.1) as reported in column (4). The mean of RESTATEMENT is higher for 
monopolist auditors than non-monopolist industry specialist auditors, and the difference 
is significant (t-stat = 6.3) as reported in column (5). This bivariate test provides 
preliminary evidence supporting H2a, the auditor complacency hypothesis. 
 
4.2. Results 
Before testing the study’s two hypotheses, I first examine the validity of the 
measure of monopolist auditors. In Section 2.3, I argue that the monopolist auditors’ 
monopoly power could be attributable to clients’ limited choices of alternative auditors, 
and I attempt to validate empirically whether clients have a limited choice of alternative 
auditors. The validation process helps show that the measure of monopolist auditor in this 
study is valid, and provides deeper understanding as to why monopolist auditors exist.  
Clients may choose alternatives to monopolist auditors in two ways. First, clients 
may choose an alternative auditor who is located within the same MSA, but does not have 
industry expertise. Second, clients might choose an alternative auditor who does provide 
audit service in the same industry, but is located farther away than monopolist auditors 
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(e.g., located outside the MSA where the clients reside). However, if such alternative 
auditors are scarce or unavailable, clients may have to choose monopolist auditors. 
To examine the first case, I regress the number of auditors within the same MSA 
and within the same industry defined as a division level (AVAIL) on MONO.29 The idea 
is that when clients look for alternative auditors (other than monopolist auditors) within 
the same MSA, they would choose an auditor who has expertise in an industry that is very 
closely related to their own industry. I define the clients’ closest industry as the industry 
within the same division-level SIC codes. For example, a client in the heavy construction 
industry division (two-digit SIC code 16) would choose an alternative auditor who has 
expertise in other kinds of construction industry in that division (two-digits SIC code 
between 15 and 17). Since a distribution of the variable (AVAIL) is left-censored, I 
estimate a negative binomial model. In the regression, I control for the size of the 
economy by the log of total number of clients within the MSA (MSA_CLIENTS), and the 
size of the audit market by the log of total audit fees generated within the MSA 
(MSA_SIZE) along with year and division-level industry fixed effects. Column (1) in 
Table 4 reports the result of the estimation. As expected, the coefficient on MONO is 
significantly negative (–0.52, t-stat = –9.9). This finding suggests that monopolist 
auditors’ clients have fewer options for other auditors who provide audit services in 
similar industries, inside the same MSA. 
                                                 
29 SIC codes can be grouped into industry group (three digits), major group (two digits), and division. The 
SIC directory contains eleven divisions based on the first two digits of SIC codes as follows: 01-09 
(Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing), 10-14 (Mining), 15-17 (Construction), 20-39 (Manufacturing), 40-49 
(Transportation & Public Utilities), 50-51 (Wholesale Trade), 52-59 (Retail Trade), 60-67 (Finance, 
Insurance, Real Estate), 70-89 (Services), and 91-99 (Public Administration). 
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To examine the second case, I manually collect auditors’ full address from their 
websites based on information of city, state, and auditor name per Audit Analytics. After 
deleting observations in which auditors’ full address information is not available, the 
sample size for the analysis is 19,043 firm-year observations. I calculate the distance 
(DIST) between clients and their closest auditors that provide audit services in the same 
industry other than their current auditors. Then, I regress DIST on MONO, using a 
negative binomial model because DIST is left-censored. I further control for the size of 
MSA (MSA_CLIENTS and MSA_SIZE) along with industry and year fixed effects. 
Column (2) in Table 4 reports the result of the estimation. As predicted, the coefficient 
on MONO is significantly positive (1.75, t-stat = 22.5). This suggests that monopolist 
auditors’ clients have difficulties in finding an alternative auditor who is located closer 
than their current auditors, and provides audit services in the same industry. 
Overall, the findings are consistent with the explanation that monopolist auditors’ clients 
have limited choices of alternative auditors.30 
 4.2.1. Effect of monopolist auditors on audit fees (H1) 
My first hypothesis examines whether monopolist auditors charge higher or lower 
audit fees incremental to the audit fees charged by industry specialist auditors. Table 5, 
Panel A reports the results from estimating equation (1), where the variable of interest is 
MONO. In Panel A, column (1) reports the results based on the full sample. The 
explanatory power (Adjusted R2 of 0.89) of audit fees model is not significantly different 
from that reported in the audit fees literature. Except for two insignificant variables, 
TENURE and CHG_AUDID, the rest of the control variables are statistically significant 
                                                 
30 These findings are based on the audit fees sample. When I conduct the same analyses on the audit quality 
sample, the inference does not change. 
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in the expected directions, comparable to those reported in Francis et al. (2005, 2013b), 
Bills et al. (2015), and Numan and Willekens (2012).  In column (1), the coefficient on 
SPEC is significantly positive, confirming prior literature about a fee premium charged 
by industry specialist auditors. The coefficient on MONO is significantly negative (–
0.087, t-stat = –3.6), suggesting that the monopolist auditors charge lower fees than 
industry specialist auditors. Column (2) reports the results based on the sample restricted 
to industry specialist auditors (SPEC = 1), where equation (1) is estimated without SPEC. 
This alternative specification reduces concerns about bias (on the coefficient on MONO) 
arising from differences in observable firm-characteristics between firms audited by non-
industry specialist auditors and firms audited by industry specialist auditors. If such 
difference does not bias the coefficient on MONO, I expect the difference in the 
coefficients across two specifications (i.e., column 1 and 2) to be insignificant. Column 
(2) reports that the coefficient on MONO is significantly negative (–0.099, t-stat = –4.2). 
More importantly, the coefficients on MONO for these two specifications are not 
significantly different (Chi-square = 1.09; p-value = 0.296), consistent with the 
expectation. 
The effect of MONO on audit fees is economically significant as well. For 
instance, the coefficient of –0.087 on MONO in column (1) means that the monopolist 
auditors charge 8.3 percent lower audit fees than industry specialist auditors.31 To further 
explore the main effect of monopolist auditors on audit fees, I examine the joint 
significance of the coefficients on SPEC and MONO, and find a positive but marginally 
significant coefficient (F-stat = 2.71). This suggests that although the monopolist auditors 
                                                 
31 The percentage effect on fee premiums (or discount) is calculated as ez – 1, where z is the parameter 
value of MONO. 
33 
charge less than the industry specialist auditors, the monopolist auditors, on average, still 
charge fee premiums. Overall, the results in Table 5, Panel A support H1b, the limit 
pricing hypothesis. 
4.2.1. Effect of monopolist auditors on audit quality (H2) 
Hypothesis 2 examines whether monopolist auditors provide higher or lower audit 
quality incremental to industry specialist auditors. In Table 5, Panel B reports the results 
from estimating equation (2). Panel B, column (1) reports the results based on the full 
sample, and column (2) reports the results based on the sample restricted to industry 
specialist auditors (SPEC = 1), where equation (2) is estimated without SPEC. 
Coefficients on control variables are in general as expected. A negative and significant 
coefficient on LAGREST confirms the misstatement is highly persistent (Palmrose et al. 
2004; Lennox and Li 2014). In addition, audit quality is likely to be low for the companies 
with large size (Lennox and Li 2014), high book-to-market ratio (Francis et al. 2013b), 
weak internal controls and high leverage (Newton et al. 2014), and new capital raises 
(Lobo and Zhao 2013). Column (1) reports the insignificant coefficient on SPEC, 
confirming no significant association between industry specialist auditors and 
misstatements (Francis et al. 2013b). More importantly, the coefficient on MONO is 
significantly negative (–0.525, z-stat = –3.7), suggesting that the monopolist auditors are 
more likely to fail to detect misstatements than industry specialist auditors. For the same 
reason as the alternative specification tested in the audit fees analysis (Panel A, Column 
1), column (2) reports the results based on the sample restricted to industry specialist 
auditors. Hence, if a bias arising from differences in observable firm-characteristics 
between firms audited by non-industry specialist auditors and firms audited by industry 
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specialist auditors is of low concern, I expect the difference in the coefficients across two 
specifications (i.e., columns 1 and 2) is insignificant. Column (2) reports that the 
coefficient on MONO is significantly positive (–0.481, z-stat = –2.9). More importantly, 
the coefficients on MONO for these two specifications are not significantly different (Chi-
square = 1.18; p-value = 0.278), consistent with the expectation. 
In an economic sense, the coefficient of –0.525 on MONO in column (1) means 
that the monopolist auditors are 69.1 percent more likely to fail to detect clients’ 
misstatements than industry specialist auditors. To further explore the main effect of 
monopolist auditors on misstatements, I examine the joint significance of the coefficients 
on SPEC and MONO, and find a significantly negative coefficient (F-stat = –17.39). This 
suggests that the monopolist auditors exhibit low quality on average. Overall, the results 
in Table 5, Panel B support H2a, the monopolist auditors’ complacency hypothesis. 
 
4.3. Robustness Tests 
4.3.1. Subsamples of Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms 
As noted in Panel B in Table 2, a majority of industry specialist and monopolist 
auditors is observed among Big 4 audit firms. Approximately 90% of industry specialist 
and 80% of monopolist auditors are Big 4 audit firms. Thus, to examine whether the main 
findings (Table 5) are driven by Big 4 audit firms only, I examine subsamples of Big 4 
and non-Big 4 audit firms, separately. 
In Table 6, Panel A, columns (1) and (2) report the results of audit fees analysis 
for companies audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms, respectively. I find that the 
coefficients on MONO are significantly negative for both Big 4 and non-Big 4 
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subsamples. Interestingly, using a Wald test, I find the difference in this coefficient across 
the two subsamples is statistically significant (–0.263, p-value < 0.01), suggesting non-
Big 4 audit firms exhibit greater limit pricing than Big 4 audit firms. This is consistent 
with non-Big 4 auditors feeling more competitive pressure (Newton et al. 2013).32 
Columns (3) and (4) report the results of audit quality analysis for firms audited by Big 4 
and non-Big 4 audit firms, respectively. Again, I find the coefficient on MONO is 
significantly negative for both subsamples, but the difference in this coefficient across 
the two subsamples is not statistically significant. Overall, these suggest that my main 
findings are robust for Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. 
4.3.2. Matched sample analyses 
A primary advantage of matching on covariates is that a specific assumption about 
the functional relation between treatment variable and control variables is not required, 
while a primary disadvantage is the lower power arising from the reduced sample size 
(Tucker 2010). A recent study by Minutti-Meza (2013) addresses a systematic difference 
(e.g., non-linearity) in clients’ size of industry specialist and non-specialist auditors, 
raising concerns about the systematic difference in clients’ size that may bias the 
coefficient on monopolist auditors because monopolist auditors are also industry 
specialist auditors. To address such concerns, I re-estimate equations (1) and (2) by 
matching clients audited by monopolist auditors with clients audited by non-monopolist 
                                                 
32 More specifically, large clients are more likely to choose bigger auditors (GAO 2008). Thus, each Big 4 
auditor may feel competitive pressure from other Big 4 auditors, while each non-Big 4 auditor may feel 
competitive pressure from both all other non-Big 4 auditors and Big 4 auditors (Newton et al. 2013). Bills 
and Stephens (2015) find otherwise, that actually, Big 4 auditors feel a greater competitive pressure from 
small audit firms than from other Big 4 auditors. 
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auditors based on size along with industry and year.33 In addition, I examine a matched 
sample on all the covariates along with industry and year. 
In Table 6, Panel B, column (1) [column (4)] reports the results of audit fees 
analysis [audit quality analysis] on the size-matched sample between monopolist and non-
monopolist auditors. Column (2) [column (5)] reports the same analysis as in column (1) 
[column (4)], except that the sample is matched on propensity scores constructed on all 
the control variables. For the audit fees analysis [columns (1) and (2)], I find the 
significant and negative coefficients on MONO regardless of matching procedures. 
Similarly, for the audit quality analysis [columns (4) and (5)], I find a significant and 
negative coefficient on MONO for the all covariates-matched sample, but an insignificant 
and negative coefficient for the size-matched sample (–0.524, z-stat = –1.59). Overall, 
these findings suggest that potential bias arising from observable client characteristics is 
of low concern in evaluating the validity of the main results of this study. 
4.3.3. Controlling for the effects of market size 
Industry specialist and monopolist auditors are not evenly distributed across 
MSAs. This could raise concerns of whether characteristics of MSAs are endogenous to 
both a presence of monopolist auditors and audit fees (or audit quality). For instance, it 
is possible that the number of clients in a small MSA is lower than the number in a large 
MSA, increasing the frequency of monopolist auditors, while the size of the clients in a 
small MSA is smaller than those in a large MSA. Also, the number of Big 4 audit firms 
within MSAs might introduce measurement errors on monopolist auditors because Big 4 
                                                 
33 The matching process follows propensity score matching to the closest neighbor without replacement.  
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audit firms may transfer necessary resources (e.g., industry specialist partners) across 
offices. 
I address these issues in two ways. First, I re-estimate equations (1) and (2) by 
matching clients audited by monopolist auditors with clients audited by non-monopolist 
auditors based on the size of MSA and industry. In Table 6, Panel B, column (3) [column 
(6)] reports the results of such re-estimations. I find a significantly negative (negative) 
coefficient on MONO in audit fees analysis (audit quality analysis). Second, I control for 
time-invariant characteristics of MSA, the size of MSA or the number of Big 4 audit firms 
within MSA. In particular, I re-estimate equations (1) and (2) along with MSA fixed 
effects, and add either total audit fees generated within a MSA (MSA_SIZE), total audit 
fees generated within a combination of MSA and industry (MSA_IND_SIZE), or total 
number of Big 4 audit firms within a MSA. In Table 6, Panel C, columns (1) and (2) 
[columns (4) and (5)] report the results of estimating equation (1) [equation (2)] with the 
additional control variable of MSA_IND_SIZE and MSA_SIZE, respectively, along with 
MSA fixed effects. In the same panel, columns (3) and (6) report the results of estimating 
equation (1) [equation (2)] with the additional control variable of MSA_BIG4. The 
coefficients on MONO in audit fees (audit quality) analysis are significantly negative 
(negative). Overall, these findings suggest that my main findings in Table 5 are not driven 
by the size of market. 
4.3.4. Positive and negative effect restatements 
Auditors appear to be more concerned with income-decreasing (negative effect) 
restatements because of the associated liability (Francis and Michas 2013; Newton et al. 
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2013). Thus, I examine whether my findings in Table 5 Panel B are robust for either 
income-decreasing (negative effect) or income-increasing (positive effect) restatements. 
I collect information about whether the restatement has a positive or negative 
effect on financial statements from Audit Analytics, and re-estimate equation (2) with 
audit quality constructed on positive (POS_RES equals 1, and 0 otherwise) and negative 
(NEG_RES equals 1, and 0 otherwise) effect restatements, separately, as dependent 
variables.34 In Table 6, Panel D, columns (1) and (2) present the estimation results with 
one minus NEG_RES and one minus POS_RES as dependent variables, respectively, 
where I follow Audit Analytics’ classification in defining the negative and positive 
effect.35 The coefficients on MONO are significantly negative for both subsamples (–
0.456 and –0.835 with one minus NEG_RES and one minus POS_RES, respectively, as 
dependent variables). To consider any biases introduced by Audit Analytics due to its 
classification scheme, I limit the negative (NEGINC_RES = 1, and 0 otherwise) and 
positive (POSINC_RES = 1, and 0 otherwise) effect restatements based on the effect of 
income only (cumulative income, in the event of multiple-consecutive restatement). 
Columns (3) and (4) present the estimation results with one minus NEGINC_RES and one 
minus POSINC_RES as dependent variables, respectively. The coefficients on MONO 
are significantly negative for both subsamples (–0.760 and –0.807 with one minus 
NEGINC_RES and one minus POSINC_RES, respectively, as dependent variables). 
                                                 
34 When examining positive (negative) effect restatements, I drop negative (positive) effect restatements. 
35 Audit Analytics classifies the effect of restatement based on its effect on income. However, in the case 
that restatements do not affect income, Audit Analytics exercises some discretions to determine how 
investors would interpret the effect, which may introduce bias in the classification. Newton et al. (2013) 
list some examples of Audit Analytics’ discretion, including “a restatement that reclassifies an asset from 
current to long-term would have a negative impact on the current ratio, and would be coded as a negative 
restatement.”  
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Overall, these results suggest the main findings in Table 5, Panel B are not driven by any 
one-directional effect restatements. 
4.3.5. Alternative specifications of industry specialization 
My study examines the effect of monopolist auditors relative to industry specialist 
auditors on audit fees and audit quality, thus it relies on specifications of industry 
specialist auditors. In other words, the validity of coefficients on MONO depends on the 
validity of SPEC. To examine internal validity of the estimation results, I adopt 
alternative specifications of industry specialist auditors. Following prior studies (Mayhew 
and Wilkins 2003; Lim and Tan 2008; and Reichelt and Wang 2010), I develop a variable, 
SPEC1, which equals one only when the audit market leader has market share at least ten 
percentage points greater than its closest competitor within the same market, and zero 
otherwise. In Panel E, Table 6, columns (1) and (3) report the results of estimating 
equations (1) and (2), respectively, with the alternative measure of industry specialist 
auditors, SPEC1. My main results are robust to this alternative specification. In addition, 
following Francis et al. (2005), I use three specifications of industry specialist auditors: 
city-level industry specialist auditors only (SPEC_ONLY), national-level industry 
specialist auditors only (NISPEC_ONLY), and both city- and national-level industry 
specialist auditors (NSPEC). In Panel E, Table 6, columns (2) and (4) report the results 
of estimating equations (1) and (2), respectively, by replacing SPEC with SPEC_ONLY, 
NISPEC_ONLY, and NSPEC. Again, my main findings are robust to this alternative 
specification. 
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4.3.6. Further restrictions on restatements 
Some restatements may not necessarily indicate auditors being complacent, 
raising concerns that restatements unrelated to audit quality may bias my main finding in 
Panel B, Table 5. I address such concerns in two ways. First, in estimating equation (2), 
I exclude restatements due to lease accounting occurring in 2005 because those 
restatements are less likely to represent auditors’ low audit quality (Newton et al. 2014). 
I find my main finding is robust. Second, when an auditor fails to detect misstatements 
but the same auditor detects them subsequently, the inference about the audit quality is 
not clear. Thus, I examine restatements detected by the SEC, clearly indicating low audit 
quality. Using Audit Analytics’ SEC comment letters, I find that 71 restatements are 
driven by the SEC. After I exclude non-SEC induced restatements, I re-estimate equation 
(2). I find that my main finding in Panel B, Table 5 is robust to such restrictions. 
 
4.4. Placebo Tests 
To assure that the evidence supporting H1b and H2a is not driven by client 
characteristics or auditor characteristics, I perform two falsification tests focusing on (i) 
clients and (ii) auditors that are associated with monopolist auditor status. First, I conduct 
a placebo test in which I create a placebo variable (P_MONO1) indicating clients who 
are audited by an industry specialist but non-monopolist auditor currently (i.e., in year t) 
but audited by a monopolist auditor in some other periods (i.e., other than in year t). 
Second, I create a placebo variable (P_MONO2) indicating auditors who are non-
monopolist industry specialists currently (i.e., in year t) but obtain the monopolist status 
in other periods (i.e., other than in year t). If the findings are truly driven by monopolist 
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auditors (in other words, auditors having monopolist status), I should not find the 
evidence, consistent with results in Table 5.  
After dropping the monopolist auditors (i.e., MONO = 1), I re-estimate equations 
(1) and (2), replacing the variable MONO with either P_MONO1 or P_MONO2. Columns 
(1) and (2) in Table 7 present the estimation results for audit fees analysis, while columns 
(3) and (4) present the estimation results for audit quality analysis. Consistent with my 
expectation, I do not find significant coefficients on placebo variables (P_MONO1 and 
P_MONO2) for audit fees and audit quality sample.
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Chapter 5: Cross-Sectional Tests  
 
To conduct cross-sectional tests, it is crucial to find factors that would affect the 
causes of the monopolist auditors to exhibit either the limit pricing hypothesis (H1b) or 
the complacency hypothesis (H2a). First, monopolist auditors exhibit limit pricing 
hypothesis for ex-ante competition reasons. Specifically, monopolist auditors charge 
lower audit fees to avoid an increase in future competition due to new entrants. On the 
other hand, monopolist auditors exhibit complacency hypothesis for ex-post competition 
reasons. In other words, monopolist auditors become complacent because there are no 
direct current competitors. Thus, for cross-sectional tests for H1b and H2a, I focus on the 
factors that monopolist auditors might face in future competitive pressure for the limit 
pricing hypothesis (H1b), while I focus on the factors that monopolist auditors might face 
in current competitive pressure for the complacency hypothesis (H2a). 
 
5.1. Effect of Homogeneous Operation (or Complex Accounting) Industries on 
Monopolist Auditors’ Limit Pricing 
Homogenous operation industries provide a great setting to examine the causal 
argument of empirical results of audit fees analysis. Bills et al. (2015) find that 
homogenous operation industries allow industry specialist auditors to transfer industry-
specific knowledge more easily at lower costs across clients, and pass cost-savings on to 
the clients. This suggests that homogenous operation industries provide more cost-
savings to auditors, thus monopolist auditors have to forgo more profits if new entrants 
enter the market. Therefore, under the limit pricing hypothesis, monopolist auditors might 
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charge even lower audit fees because they have greater incentives to deter potential 
entrants. To examine this, I partition the sample into clients in homogenous operation 
industries (HGEN = 1) and non-homogenous operation industries (HGEN = 0), where 
homogenous operation industries are as defined in Cairney and Young (2006) and Bills 
et al. (2015).36 Then, I estimate equation (1) for each subsample separately. In Table 8, 
Panel A, columns (1) and (2) report the estimation results without MONO for non-
homogenous and homogenous operation industries, respectively. I find that the 
coefficient on SPEC is less in the homogeneous operation industries (0.115 for HGEN = 
0 vs. 0.066 for HGEN = 1). The difference in this coefficient across the two subsamples 
is statistically significant (–0.049, p-value < 0.10), consistent with Bills et al. (2015). 
Columns (3) and (4) report the estimation results including the variable of interest 
(MONO) of this study for each subsample. I find significantly negative coefficients on 
MONO for both subsamples. More importantly, the negative coefficient is more 
pronounced in the homogeneous operation industry group, and the difference in this 
coefficient across the two subsamples is statistically significant (–0.108, p-value < 0.05). 
This finding is consistent with the prediction that monopolist auditors exhibit more 
pronounced limit pricing among clients in homogenous operation industries. 
Next, complex accounting industries also might affect monopolist auditors’ 
concerns about future competition. The complex accounting practices increase audit 
firms’ investment in audit technologies, and require work performed by more experienced 
employees (Bills et al. 2015). Thus, complex accounting industries themselves function 
                                                 
36 To identify homogeneous operation industries, I undertook the following procedures. First, I calculated 
the mean value of the Pearson correlation coefficients of the annual percentage change in operating 
expenses in a three-digit SIC code over the sample period. Then, HGEN equals one if the calculated mean 
value is above the third quartile, and zero otherwise.   
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as barriers to entry for potential entrants, suggesting that monopolist auditors would feel 
less fear for future competition. Consequently, I expect that limit pricing would be less 
pronounced among clients in complex accounting industries. To examine this, I partition 
the sample into clients in complex accounting industries (COMPLEX = 1) and non-
complex accounting industries (COMPLEX = 0), where complex accounting industries 
are defined as in Seavey (2011) and Bills et al. (2015).37 In Table 8, Panel A, columns (5) 
and (6) report the estimation results without MONO for non-complex and complex 
accounting industries, respectively. I find the coefficient on SPEC is less in the complex 
accounting industries (0.119 for COMPLEX = 0 vs. 0.076 for COMPLEX = 1). The 
difference in this coefficient across the two subsamples is statistically significant (–0.043, 
p-value < 0.10). Columns (7) and (8) report the results including the variable of interest 
(MONO) of this study for two subsamples. I find the coefficient on MONO is significantly 
negative (–0.207, t-stat = –7.1) for non-complex accounting industries, and negative (–
0.058, t-stat = –1.1) but insignificant for complex accounting industries. The difference 
in this coefficient across the two subsamples is statistically significant (–0.149, p-value < 
0.01). This finding is consistent with the prediction that monopolist auditors exhibit less 
pronounced limit pricing among clients in complex accounting industries. 
 
5.2. Effect of MSA-Level Audit Market Competition on Monopolist Auditors’ 
Complacency 
Monopolist auditors would face current competitive pressure if they reside in a 
highly competitive local audit market (i.e., MSA-level). Given the hypothesis that 
                                                 
37 Seavey (2011) and Bills et al. (2015) follow AICPA Audit & Accounting Guide to identify complex 
accounting industries. 
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monopolist auditors exhibit complacency, I expect that their complacency is more 
pronounced in less competitive MSAs. To examine this, I partition the sample into 
auditors in low competition MSAs (LOWCOMP = 1) and all others (LOWCOMP = 0) 
where LOWCOMP equals one for the bottom quintile-rank of the inverse of the 
Herfindahl index calculated within MSA, and zero otherwise.38 In Table 8, Panel B, 
column (1) attempts to replicate the main finding of Newton et al. (2013). With one minus 
GAAP-related restatements (i.e., fraud- or error-related restatements are excluded) as a 
dependent variable, the coefficient on AUD_COMP is significantly negative, consistent 
with Newton et al. (2013). Columns (2) and (3) report the results from estimating equation 
(2) for two subsamples split on LOWCOMP, with one minus GAAP-related restatements 
as a dependent variable.39 I find a significantly negative coefficient (–0.956, z-stat = –
3.4) on MONO for low competition MSA. Consistent with my expectation, using a Wald 
test for differences across regressions (LOWCOMP = 0 vs. LOWCOMP = 1), the 
coefficient on MONO is more negative (–0.901, p-value < 0.05) when monopolist 
auditors are in low competition MSAs. Columns (4) and (5) report the results of the same 
estimation, but with one minus all types of restatement (RESTATEMENT) as a dependent 
variable. I also find a significantly negative coefficient (–1.121, z-stat = –4.7) on MONO 
for low competition MSAs, and a negative but insignificant coefficient (–0.184, z-stat = 
–0.9) on MONO for high competition MSAs. Notably, the coefficient on MONO is more 
negative (–0.933, p-value < 0.01) when monopolist auditors are in low competition 
                                                 
38 Following Newton et al. (2013), AUD_COMP is defined as quintile-rank of MSA-level Herfindahl index. 
Thus, LOWCOMP = 1 is essentially equivalent to AUD_COMP = 1. The results are robust when 
LOWCOMP is assigned for the bottom two quintiles of the Herfindahl index (i.e., AUD_COMP = 1 or 2). 
39 Restatements arising from reasons other than misapplication of GAAP are deleted. 
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MSAs. These findings are consistent with the prediction that monopolist auditors’ 
complacency decreases when the current audit firm competition is severe.
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Chapter 6: Additional Analyses  
 
6.1. Alternative Explanation – Economies of Scale 
An alternative explanation for the monopolist auditors’ limit pricing is that 
monopolist auditors possess greater economies of scale than industry specialist auditors, 
thus enjoying larger cost-savings, and they pass the savings on to their clients (Fung et 
al. 2012). To address whether the economies of scale rather than the limit pricing explains 
the lower fees charged by the monopolist auditors, I examine subsamples split on two 
different proxies for economies of scale. First, I examine city-industry markets with only 
two clients (HNUM = 0), and more than two clients (HNUM = 1), separately.40 Thus, a 
subsample of HNUM = 0 (HNUM = 1) implies that auditors have low (high) economies 
of scale. Second, I adopt a proxy for economies of scale (SCALE) from Fung et al. (2012). 
In particular, I calculate the number of clients the auditor has in each city-industry for 
each year, so that SCALE that represents the percentile rank of the calculated number of 
clients in the first step across all city-industry combinations for each year. I then split the 
audit fees sample into subsamples of below-median of SCALE (HSCALE = 0) and above-
median of SCALE (HSCALE = 1), representing low and high economies of scale, 
respectively. In Table 9, columns (1) and (2) report the results from estimating equation 
(1) for both subsamples divided on HNUM. I find the coefficients on MONO are 
significantly negative for both subsamples; however, those coefficients are not 
significantly different. I reach a similar conclusion when I compare the results reported 
                                                 
40 Since the median number of clients of monopolist auditors is two, I split the sample based on whether 
the number of clients in a city-industry market is two or more. Inference does not change when the sample 
is split based on whether the number of clients in a city-industry market is less than or equal to three (four) 
or more than three (four). 
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in column (3) to that in column (4), subsamples divided on HSCALE. Overall, I find 
significantly negative coefficients on MONO regardless of the auditors’ economies of 
scale, but no statistically significant difference on the coefficients between high and low 
economies of scale. These findings provide assurance that the alternative mechanism (i.e., 
economies of scale) is less likely to explain the monopolist auditors’ pricing strategy. 
 
6.2. Path Analysis 
A recent study by Huang et al. (2015) examines the effect of audit market 
concentration on audit fees and audit quality in a Chinese audit market. They argue that 
if audit market concentration affects both audit fees and audit quality, audit market 
concentration could affect audit quality directly as well as indirectly through audit fees. 
They also show that direct and indirect effects could be offset. Their findings emphasize 
the importance of considering an indirect effect of audit market concentration on audit 
quality via audit fees (a mediating variable) as well as a direct effect of audit market 
concentration on audit quality. By employing path analysis, I explore direct and indirect 
effects of audit market concentration on audit quality.  
Table 10 reports the results of the path analysis (Refer to Figure 3 for the graphical 
description). Using Sobel’s (1982) mediation tests, I report the standardized coefficients 
in the first column, and test statistics in the second column.41 I find that MONO has a 
significantly negative effect on AQ, confirming the main findings in Table 5, Panel B. 
                                                 
41 T-statistics are reported for the direct effect of monopolist auditors (MONO) and audit fees (LAFEE) on 
audit quality (1 minus RESTATEMENT), while z-statistics are reported for all other effects. I acknowledge 
Sobel (1982) tests are based on OLS regression. Thus, I perform binary mediation tests that account for the 
dichotomous outcome variable (AQ). Results using binary mediation tests are very similar to the results 
reported in Table 10. The significance for the mediating path, an indirect effect, and a total effect are 
determined based on 1,000-times bootstrapping. While the total effect is significant at 1% level, the 
mediating path and the indirect effect are significant at 5% level.  
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Focusing on the mediating variable, MONO has a significantly negative effect on LAFEE 
(a mediating variable), and LAFEE has a significantly positive effect on AQ (an outcome 
variable). This translates into a negative indirect effect of MONO on AQ via LAFEE, with 
a significance level of p-value less than 0.10. Meanwhile, the total effect (coefficient of 
–0.055, p-value < 0.01) of MONO on AQ is very similar to the direct effect (coefficient 
of –0.055, p-value <0.01). In addition, the proportion of the total effect mediated is 1.1%. 
These findings suggest that the indirect effect explains a very small portion of the effect 
of MONO on AQ, while the direct effect dominantly explains the main findings in Table 
5, Panel B. 
 
6.3. Effect of Auditor Market Share Increments on Audit Fees and Audit Quality 
To investigate whether findings in this study are driven by monopolist auditors or 
auditors having a large enough market share (i.e., close to 100% market share) to behave 
like monopolist auditors, I test the effect of auditor market share increments by 5% on 
audit fees and audit quality.42 Specifically, I replace SPEC with ten variables (i.e., 
SPECD1 through SPECD10) where SPECD1 (SPECD2, SPECD3, … and SPECD10) 
indicates auditors having greater than 50% (55%, 60%, … and 95%) market shares, 
respectively. Hence, the coefficient on SPECD1 is interpreted as the incremental effect 
of auditors having between 50% and 55% market share relative to auditors having less 
than 50%. Each of the next nine SPECD variables capture the incremental effect of 
auditors by having 5% more market share. In Table 11, column 1 (column 2) presents the 
                                                 
42 I determine market share increments of 5% because smaller increments significantly reduce the number 
of observations within certain increments. For example, there are no observations with auditors having 
market share between 97% and 99%. 
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results of the estimation for audit fees (audit quality) analysis. In column (1), several 
market share increment variables are significantly positive. For instance, the positive 
coefficient on SPECD6 means that auditors having a market share between 75% and 80% 
charge incrementally higher fees than auditors having a market share between 70% and 
75%. Most importantly, the coefficient on MONO is significantly negative, implying that 
monopolist auditors charge lower fees than auditors having a market share between 95% 
and 100% (not inclusive). In addition, in column (2), the coefficient on MONO is negative 
and significant, meaning that monopolist auditors provide lower audit quality than 
auditors having a market share between 95% and 100% (not inclusive). Figure 4 (Figure 
5) visualizes the effect of market share increments on audit fees (audit quality). In sum, 
these results suggest that findings in this study are driven by monopolist auditors rather 
than auditors having a large enough market share (i.e., close to 100% market share).
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Chapter 7: Discussion  
 
In this section, I discuss why auditors monopolize the market, and why clients 
hire a monopolist auditor. First, auditors may monopolize the market for several reasons. 
As argued in the prior literature (Fung et al. 2012; Bills et al. 2015), auditors can reduce 
unit costs of audit production as they expand operations within a particular market (e.g., 
a particular industry). Therefore, considering cost-savings, auditors in general are more 
likely to add new clients, and some auditors could reach 100% market share. In other 
words, audit market monopoly could arise simply due to auditors’ efforts to obtain 
additional clients. Another explanation, of course, is that an auditor might want to achieve 
a monopolist position. This is possible if clients perceive a more prestigious reputation 
for audit firms having a monopolist position is significant. In particular, clients might 
perceive that a monopolist auditor’s reputation for industry expertise is superior to that 
of an industry specialist auditors, because a monopolist auditor is the only one auditor in 
a particular audit market (i.e., city-industry) while there exist alternative auditors in a 
non-monopoly audit market. 
From the standpoint of clients, all the clients in an audit market may want to hire 
a certain auditor if there are enough benefits in either fees or service quality. For instance, 
if a certain auditor charges the cheapest audit fees in the market, such benefits could drive 
the auditor to become a monopolist. However, this explanation is not likely supported, 
because the main effects of monopolist auditors in Table 5 suggest that monopolist 
auditors charge a fee premium but provide low audit quality, on average. An alternative 
explanation is that clients are forced to choose a monopolist auditor, because clients have 
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limited choices of auditors other than the monopolist auditor. This explanation is 
supported by empirical results in Table 4.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion  
 
Regulators have frequently expressed concerns about audit market concentration 
and its potentially detrimental effect on audit fees and quality. Despite these concerns, 
research has shown inconclusive results on the issue. In this study, I focus on auditors 
who monopolize audit markets in city-industry markets, an extreme case of audit market 
concentration. Using this unique setting, I investigate the monopolist auditors’ pricing 
strategy and audit quality. 
I find that monopolist auditors charge lower fees than industry specialist auditors, 
contrary to regulators’ concerns about monopoly pricing, but consistent with limit pricing 
theory. I also find that monopolist auditors are more likely to fail to detect misstatements 
than industry specialist auditors, consistent with the complacency hypothesis, confirming 
regulators’ concerns about dominant auditors’ low incentives to provide high audit 
quality. In cross-sectional tests for limit pricing, I examine factors that could predict 
monopolist auditors would have concerns about future competitive pressure. I find that 
the limit pricing is more pronounced among clients in homogenous operation industries 
where monopolist auditors might lose more profits when new entrants enter the market, 
and is less pronounced among clients in complex accounting industries where the future 
competitive pressure is low. Also, in cross-sectional tests for complacency, I examine a 
factor that could predict monopolist auditors would have concerns about the current 
competitive pressure, finding that monopolist auditors’ audit failures are more 
pronounced in less competitive MSAs, where monopolist auditors would be more 
complacent. Finally, the alternative argument of economies of scale does not explain 
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monopolist auditors’ pricing strategy. Additionally, I find that monopolist auditors make 
more misstatements indirectly, via the reduced audit fees that monopolist auditors charge, 
as well as directly, which supports monopolist auditors’ complacency. 
My study makes several important contributions. By exploiting unique settings 
(monopolist auditors), this study provides new perspectives that might be useful for 
regulators in evaluating audit market concentration and its effect on audit fees and quality. 
Second, the current study adds to the audit market concentration literature, the area where 
DeFond and Zhang (2014) and GAO (2003, 2008) call for further research. Finally, my 
study expands industry specialist literature by providing evidence of how industry 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables 
LAFEE = The natural logarithm of audit fees. 
RESTATEMENT = 1 if a company’s financial statement in year t is restated in the 
subsequent periods, and 0 otherwise. 
AQ = one minus RESTATEMEMT. 
NEG_RES = 1 if the effect of restatement on financial statement is negative 
(based on Audit Analytics’ scheme), and 0 otherwise. 
POS_RES = 1 if the effect of restatement on financial statement is positive 
(base on Audit Analytics’ scheme), and 0 otherwise. 
NEGINC_RES = 1 if the effect of restatement on income is negative, and 0 
otherwise.  
POSINC_RES = 1 if the effect of restatement on income is positive, and 0 
otherwise.  
DIST = The distance (in kilometers) between a client and the closest 
auditor providing audit services in the same industry, other than 
the current auditor.  
AVAIL = The number of auditors within city (defined as MSA) and 
division-level industry. 
Variables of Interest 
MONO 
 
= 1 if the auditor has 100% market shares in an industry (defined 
as two-digit SIC code), and in a particular city (defined as MSA), 
and 0 otherwise. 
SPEC = 1 if the auditor has market shares greater than 50% in an industry 
(defined as two-digit SIC code) and in a particular city (defined 
as MSA), and 0 otherwise. 
SPEC1 = 1 if the auditor has the largest market share in an industry 
(defined as two-digit SIC code) and in a particular city (defined 
as MSA), and if its market share is at least 10 percentage points 
greater than its closest competitor, and 0 otherwise. 
Control Variables 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets.  
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 audit firms, and 0 otherwise. 
LOSS = 1 if the firm’s income before tax is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
BM = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity. 
LIQ = The sum of current assets (cash, accounts receivable, and 
inventory) divided by total assets. 
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ROA = Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
RECINV = The sum of accounts receivables and inventories divided by 
total assets. 
LEV = Total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
NBUSSEG = The natural logarithm of the number of business segments. 
NFORGN = The natural logarithm of the number of foreign-geographic 
segments. 
OFFICESIZE = The natural logarithm of total audit fees generated in the audit 
office. 
NSPECIALIST = 1 if the auditor has market shares greater than 30% in an industry 
(defined as two-digit SIC code) in nation-wide, and 0 otherwise. 





= 1 year-lagged measure of RESTATEMENT 
= 1 if the firm is an accelerated filer, and 0 otherwise. 
= 1 if the audit is an initial year audit, and 0 otherwise. 
= 1 if the firm is listed in the main stock exchange, and 0 otherwise 
ICWEAK = 1 if internal control material weakness is reported, and 0 
otherwise. 
GC = 1 if the audit opinion is going-concern opinion, and 0 otherwise. 
MA = 1 if the firm is involved in mergers and acquisitions, and 0 
otherwise. 
DEC_YE = 1 if the firm’s year-end is December 31, and 0 otherwise. 
EXTFIND = 1 if FREECASH < –0.5, and 0 otherwise, where FREECASH is 
cash flows from operations minus average capital expenditure 
scaled by lagged current assets. 
LNAFEE = The natural logarithm of non-audit fees. 
AUD_COMP = Yearly quintile-rank of (Herfindahl index multiplied by –1), 
where Herfindahl index represents audit market concentration 
within MSA, where Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of 
square of each auditor’s market share (measured as total audit fees 
generated from each audit office) within a MSA, divided by 
square of total market size (measured as total audit fees generated 
from the MSA) of the MSA. 
LNREPORTLAG = The natural logarithm of the days between fiscal year-end and 
the audit opinion signature date. 
GROWTH = (Sales in year t minus sales in year t–1) divided by sales in year 
t–1. 
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UO = 1 if the firm’s audit opinion is unqualified opinion, and 0 
otherwise. 
LNAGE = The natural logarithm of company age (based on Compustat 
listing). 
DREC = (Receivables in year t minus receivables in year t–1) divided by 
receivables in year t–1. 
CACCR = Change in noncash current assets from year t–1 to t scaled by 
average total assets.  
FIN = 1 if the sum of new long-term debt plus new equity is greater 
than 2% of lagged total assets, and 0 otherwise. 
MSA_CLIENTS = The natural logarithm of total number of companies within a 
MSA. 
MSA_SIZE = The natural logarithm of total audit fees generated within a 
MSA. 
MSA_IND_SIZE = The natural logarithm of total audit fees generated within a 
combination of MSA and industry. 
MSA_BIG4 = Number of Big 4 audit firms within a MSA. 
SPEC_ONLY = 1 if SPEC = 1 and NSPECIALIST = 0, and 0 otherwise. 
NISPEC_ONLY = 1 if SPEC = 0 and NSPECIALIST = 1, and 0 otherwise. 
NSPEC = 1 if SPEC = 1 and NSPECIALIST = 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsamples-Splitting Variables 
HGEN = Following Cairney and Young (2006) and Bills et al. (2015), the 
mean value of the Pearson correlation coefficients of the annual 
percentage change in operating expenses in a three-digit SIC code 
over the sample period is calculated. Then, HGEN equals 1 if the 
calculated mean value is above third quartile of the sample, and 0 
otherwise. 
COMPLEX = Following Seavey (2011) and Bills et al. (2015), COMPEX 
equals 1 (0 otherwise) if two-digit industry is one of the following: 
01, 02, 07, 13, 15, 16, 17, 37, 45, 73, 79, 80, and 87. 
LOWCOMP = 1 for the bottom yearly quintile-rank of inverse of Herfindahl 
index (AUD_COMP = 1), where Herfindahl index represents 
audit market concentration within MSA, and 0 otherwise. 
HNUM = 1 if an auditor’s total number of clients within city-industry 
market is two, and 0 otherwise (i.e., more than two). 
HSCALE = 1 if SCALE is above sample median, and 0 otherwise. SCALE is 
defined as in Fung et al. (2012). First, the number of clients the 
auditor has in each city-industry for each year is calculated. Then, 
SCALE represents the percentile rank of the calculated number of 
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Total indirect effects: –0.001* or 
% Effect Mediated: 1.1% 
Figure 3. Graphical Description of Path Analysis 
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Figure 4. Effect of Auditors’ Market Share Increments on Audit Fees 
 
 



















































Table 1. Sample Selection 
 
 Firm-years 
Initial procedures to construct MONO and SPEC observations 
Compustat observations during 2004 - 2013 93,584 
Exclude observations with missing CIK (9,633) 
Exclude observations that are missing Audit Analytics dataa (18,267) 
Exclude observations that do not match with MSA data  
by office location 
(7,990) 
Exclude observations that only one firm exists in the industry-
city market 
(7,131) 
Sample from initial sample procedures 50,563 
  
Additional restrictions for audit fees sample (H1):   
Exclude observations with missing values to compute control 
variables 
(21,453) 
Exclude observations in financial (SIC 6000-6999) or  
utilities (SIC 4400-4999) industries 
(8,777) 
Final sample for audit fees analysis 20,333 
  
Additional restrictions for audit quality sample (H2)   
     Exclude observations with missing values to compute control 
variables 
(15,137) 
Exclude observations in financial (SIC 6000-6999) or  
utilities (SIC 4400-4999) industries 
(15,974) 
Final sample for audit quality analysis 19,452 
  
 
a After merging, fiscal year follows Compustat convention.  





















 Panel A: Total number of industry specialist and monopolist auditors  
 
 Audit fees sample  Audit quality sample 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev.  N Mean Std. Dev. 
SPEC 20,333 0.270 0.444  19,452 0.293 0.455 
MONO 20,333 0.031 0.173  19,452 0.039 0.193 
Panel B: Frequency of industry specialist and monopolist auditors by 
audit firm 
 
     
 Audit fees sample  Audit quality sample 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 SPEC  MONO  SPEC  MONO 
Audit firm Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. % 
PWC 1,414 25.75  125 19.97  1,526 26.79  153 20.40 
EY 1,985 36.14  184 29.39  2,012 35.32  214 28.53 
Deloitte 866 15.77  102 16.29  969 17.01  142 18.93 
KPMG 651 11.85  75 11.98  671 11.78  104 13.87 
Non-Big 4 576 10.49  140 22.37  519 9.10  137 18.27 
Total 5,492 100.00  626 100.00  5,697 100.00  750 100.00 
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Table 2. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics of Industry Specialist and Monopolist Auditors 
 
Panel C: Frequency of SPEC and MONO by industry 
 
 Audit fees sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 SPEC  MONO 
Industry description Freq. %  Freq. % 
Agricultural Production-Crops 8 0.15   0 0.00 
Agricultural Production-Livestock 0 0.00   0 0.00 
Agricultural Services 2 0.04   0 0.00 
Metal Mining 89 1.62   14 2.24 
Coal Mining 61 1.11   39 6.23 
Oil and Gas Extraction 149 2.71   21 3.35 
Mining & Quarrying-nonmetallic 
Minerals 
8 0.15   0 0.00 
Building Construction-gen Contractors 57 1.04   8 1.28 
Heavy Construction Except Building 21 0.38   3 0.48 
Construction-special Trade 
Contractors 
21 0.38   0 0.00 
Food and Kindred Products Mfrs 160 2.91   23 3.67 
Textile Mill Product Mfrs 6 0.11   0 0.00 
Apparel Mfrs 32 0.58   8 1.28 
Lumber & Wood Prods Except 
Furnture Mfrs 
28 0.51   4 0.64 
Furniture and Fixture Mfrs 29 0.53   2 0.32 
Paper and Allied Product Mfrs 102 1.86   55 8.79 
Printing and Publishing 49 0.89   4 0.64 
Chemicals and Allied Products Mfrs 1,000 18.21   42 6.71 
Petroleum Refining & Related Inds 
Mfrs 
53 0.97   0 0.00 
Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Mfrs 55 1.00   0 0.00 
Leather & Leather Products Mfrs 35 0.64   0 0.00 
Stone Clay Glass & Concrete Prods 
Mfrs 
61 1.11   26 4.15 
Primary Metal Industries Mfrs 143 2.60   44 7.03 
Fabricated Metal Products Mfrs 102 1.86   8 1.28 
Industrial & Commercial Machinery 
Mfrs 
424 7.72   32 5.11 
Electronic & Other Electrical Equip 
Mfrs 
410 7.47   44 7.03 
Transportation Equipment Mfrs 178 3.24   20 3.19 
Measuring & Analyzing Instruments 485 8.83   15 2.40 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Inds 
Mfrs 
64 1.17   0 0.00 
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Table 2. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics of Industry Specialist and Monopolist Auditors 
 
Panel C (Continued):  Frequency of SPEC and MONO by industry 
 
 Audit fees sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 SPEC  MONO 
Industry description Freq. %  Freq. % 
Railroad Transportation 1 0.02   0 0.00 
Local/suburban Transit & Hwy 
Passenger 
6 0.11   0 0.00 
Motor Freight 
Transportation/warehouse 
55 1.00   18 2.88 
General Merchandise Stores 2 0.04   0 0.00 
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 159 2.90   19 3.04 
Wholesale Trade-nondurable Goods 87 1.58   20 3.19 
Food Stores 1 0.02   0 0.00 
Automotive Dealers & Service 
Stations 
11 0.20   3 0.48 
Apparel & Accessory Stores 16 0.29   4 0.64 
Home Furniture & Furnishings Stores 7 0.13   0 0.00 
Eating & Drinking Places 19 0.35   0 0.00 
Miscellaneous Retail 62 1.13   4 0.64 
Hotels Rooming Houses & Camps 25 0.46   13 2.08 
Personal Services 25 0.46   11 1.76 
Business Services 501 9.12   34 5.43 
Auto Repair Services & Parking 7 0.13   0 0.00 
Motion Pictures 18 0.33   0 0.00 
Amusement & Recreation Services 99 1.80   2 0.32 
Health Services 238 4.33   61 9.74 
Educational Services 52 0.95   7 1.12 
Social Services 11 0.20   1 0.16 
Engineering & Accounting & Mgmt 
Svcs 
163 2.97   4 0.64 
Nonclassified Establishments 95 1.73   13 2.08 
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Table 2. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics of Industry Specialist and Monopolist Auditors 
 
 
Panel C (Continued): Frequency of SPEC and MONO by industry 
 
 Audit quality sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 SPEC  MONO 
Industry description Freq. %  Freq. % 
Agricultural Production-Crops 26 0.46   12 1.60 
Agricultural Production-Livestock 1 0.02   1 0.13 
Agricultural Services 2 0.04   0 0.00 
Metal Mining 59 1.04   8 1.07 
Coal Mining 66 1.16   41 5.47 
Oil and Gas Extraction 151 2.65   20 2.67 
Mining & Quarrying-nonmetallic 
Minerals 
10 0.18   6 0.80 
Building Construction-gen Contractors 58 1.02   8 1.07 
Heavy Construction Except Building 22 0.39   4 0.53 
Construction-special Trade 
Contractors 
21 0.37   0 0.00 
Food and Kindred Products Mfrs 163 2.86   22 2.93 
Textile Mill Product Mfrs 6 0.11   0 0.00 
Apparel Mfrs 35 0.61   9 1.20 
Lumber & Wood Prods Except 
Furnture Mfrs 
27 0.47   4 0.53 
Furniture and Fixture Mfrs 29 0.51   2 0.27 
Paper and Allied Product Mfrs 113 1.98   61 8.13 
Printing and Publishing 52 0.91   8 1.07 
Chemicals and Allied Products Mfrs 964 16.92   42 5.60 
Petroleum Refining & Related Inds 
Mfrs 
51 0.90   0 0.00 
Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Mfrs 54 0.95   1 0.13 
Leather & Leather Products Mfrs 36 0.63   0 0.00 
Stone Clay Glass & Concrete Prods 
Mfrs 
61 1.07   26 3.47 
Primary Metal Industries Mfrs 152 2.67   52 6.93 
Fabricated Metal Products Mfrs 109 1.91   10 1.33 
Industrial & Commercial Machinery 
Mfrs 
434 7.62   37 4.93 
Electronic & Other Electrical Equip 
Mfrs 
452 7.93   46 6.13 
Transportation Equipment Mfrs 205 3.60   29 3.87 
Measuring & Analyzing Instruments 493 8.65   17 2.27 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Inds 
Mfrs 
70 1.23   0 0.00 
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Table 2. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics of Industry Specialist and Monopolist Auditors 
 
Panel C (Continued):  Frequency of SPEC and MONO by industry 
 
 Audit quality sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 SPEC  MONO 
Industry description Freq. %  Freq. % 
Railroad Transportation 2 0.04   0 0.00 
Local/suburban Transit & Hwy 
Passenger 
164 2.88   27 3.60 
Motor Freight 
Transportation/warehouse 
86 1.51   21 2.80 
General Merchandise Stores 1 0.02   0 0.00 
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 12 0.21   4 0.53 
Wholesale Trade-nondurable Goods 16 0.28   4 0.53 
Food Stores 10 0.18   2 0.27 
Automotive Dealers & Service 
Stations 
20 0.35   0 0.00 
Apparel & Accessory Stores 63 1.11   8 1.07 
Home Furniture & Furnishings Stores 24 0.42   12 1.60 
Eating & Drinking Places 29 0.51   13 1.73 
Miscellaneous Retail 560 9.83   37 4.93 
Hotels Rooming Houses & Camps 9 0.16   2 0.27 
Personal Services 27 0.47   2 0.27 
Business Services 104 1.83   7 0.93 
Auto Repair Services & Parking 243 4.27   62 8.27 
Motion Pictures 51 0.90   7 0.93 
Amusement & Recreation Services 19 0.33   9 1.20 
Health Services 164 2.88   6 0.80 
Educational Services 98 1.72   0 0.00 
Social Services 2 0.04   0 0.00 
Engineering & Accounting & Mgmt 
Svcs 
164 2.88   27 3.60 
Nonclassified Establishments 86 1.51   21 2.80 
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Table 2. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics of Industry Specialist and Monopolist Auditors 
 
Panel D: Frequency of SPEC and MONO by MSA 
 
 Audit fees sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 SPEC  MONO 
MSA name Freq. %  Freq. % 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 23 0.42   12 1.92 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 104 1.89   20 3.19 
Austin-Round Rock, TX 49 0.89   10 1.60 
Bakersfield, CA 7 0.13   6 0.96 
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 73 1.33   2 0.32 
Baton Rouge, LA 11 0.20   11 1.76 
Billings, MT 0 0.00   0 0.00 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 1 0.02   1 0.16 
Boise City, ID 2 0.04   1 0.16 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 232 4.22   10 1.60 
Boulder, CO 4 0.07   4 0.64 
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 79 1.44   3 0.48 
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 3 0.05   3 0.48 
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, 
NY 
30 0.55   0 0.00 
Cedar Rapids, IA 0 0.00   0 0.00 
Charleston, WV 0 0.00   0 0.00 
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC 56 1.02   10 1.60 
Chattanooga, TN-GA 0 0.00   0 0.00 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 294 5.35   25 3.99 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 63 1.15   20 3.19 
Cleveland-Elyria, OH 167 3.04   8 1.28 
Columbus, OH 11 0.20   3 0.48 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 210 3.82   30 4.79 
Dayton, OH 6 0.11   0 0.00 
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 165 3.00   5 0.80 
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 20 0.36   15 2.40 
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI 58 1.06   1 0.16 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 1 0.02   0 0.00 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-
MO 
8 0.15   8 1.28 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 40 0.73   25 3.99 
Greensboro-High Point, NC 1 0.02   0 0.00 
Greenville-Anderson-Mauldin, SC 1 0.02   0 0.00 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, 
CT 
86 1.57   24 3.83 
75 
Table 2. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics of Industry Specialist and Monopolist Auditors 
 
Panel D (Continued): Frequency of SPEC and MONO by MSA 
 
 Audit fees sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 SPEC  MONO 
MSA name Freq. %  Freq. % 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, 
TX 
180 3.28   4 0.64 
Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN 50 0.91   19 3.04 
Jacksonville, FL 14 0.25   4 0.64 
Kansas City, MO-KS 51 0.93   6 0.96 
Knoxville, TN 3 0.05   2 0.32 
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 89 1.62   5 0.80 
Lexington-Fayette, KY 0 0.00   0 0.00 
Little Rock-North Little Rock-
Conway, AR 
1 0.02   0 0.00 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, 
CA 
274 4.99   11 1.76 
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 19 0.35   0 0.00 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 16 0.29   2 0.32 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm 
Beach, FL 
131 2.39   19 3.04 
Midland, MI 10 0.18   10 1.60 
Midland, TX 1 0.02   1 0.16 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 65 1.18   5 0.80 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, 
MN-WI 
132 2.40   19 3.04 
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--
Franklin, TN 
59 1.07   13 2.08 
New Orleans-Metairie, LA 29 0.53   6 0.96 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-
NJ-PA 
280 5.10   0 0.00 
Odessa, TX 4 0.07   4 0.64 
Ogden-Clearfield, UT 17 0.31   12 1.92 
Oklahoma City, OK 11 0.20   0 0.00 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 31 0.56   12 1.92 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 26 0.47   0 0.00 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, 
PA-NJ-DE-MD 
231 4.21   37 5.91 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 79 1.44   2 0.32 
Pittsburgh, PA 108 1.97   0 0.00 
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-
WA 
103 1.88   22 3.51 
Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 2 0.04   0 0.00 
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Table 2. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics of Industry Specialist and Monopolist Auditors 
 
Panel D (Continued): Frequency of SPEC and MONO by MSA 
 
 Audit fees sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 SPEC  MONO 
MSA name Freq. %  Freq. % 
Raleigh, NC 58 1.06   6 0.96 
Reno, NV 8 0.15   6 0.96 
Richmond, VA 28 0.51   1 0.16 
Rochester, NY 36 0.66   5 0.80 
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-
Arcade, CA 
19 0.35   4 0.64 
Salt Lake City, UT 107 1.95   11 1.76 
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 42 0.76   3 0.48 
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 254 4.62   19 3.04 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 200 3.64   31 4.95 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 403 7.34   2 0.32 
San Juan-Carolina-Caguas, PR 0 0.00   0 0.00 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 95 1.73   2 0.32 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 1 0.02   1 0.16 
Spokane-Spokane Valley, WA 18 0.33   0 0.00 
St. Louis, MO-IL 124 2.26   31 4.95 
Syracuse, NY 2 0.04   1 0.16 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 83 1.51   7 1.12 
Toledo, OH 20 0.36   2 0.32 
Trenton, NJ 11 0.20   2 0.32 
Tulsa, OK 47 0.86   16 2.56 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 
DC-VA-MD-WV 
0 0.00   3 0.48 
Wichita, KS 1 0.02   1 0.16 
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Table 2. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics of Industry Specialist and Monopolist Auditors 
 
Panel D (Continued): Frequency of SPEC and MONO by MSA 
 
 Audit quality sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 SPEC  MONO 
MSA name Freq. %  Freq. % 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 26 0.46   13 1.73 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 120 2.11   23 3.07 
Austin-Round Rock, TX 50 0.88   12 1.60 
Bakersfield, CA 2 0.04   2 0.27 
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 76 1.33   4 0.53 
Baton Rouge, LA 11 0.19   11 1.47 
Billings, MT 6 0.11   6 0.80 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 2 0.04   2 0.27 
Boise City, ID 1 0.02   1 0.13 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 248 4.35   11 1.47 
Boulder, CO 4 0.07   4 0.53 
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 85 1.49   8 1.07 
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 4 0.07   4 0.53 
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, 
NY 
31 0.54   1 0.13 
Cedar Rapids, IA 2 0.04   2 0.27 
Charleston, WV 3 0.05   3 0.40 
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC 56 0.98   11 1.47 
Chattanooga, TN-GA 3 0.05   3 0.40 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 299 5.25   29 3.87 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 67 1.18   25 3.33 
Cleveland-Elyria, OH 178 3.12   12 1.60 
Columbus, OH 17 0.30   10 1.33 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 210 3.69   30 4.00 
Dayton, OH 9 0.16   5 0.67 
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 165 2.90   6 0.80 
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 19 0.33   14 1.87 
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI 59 1.04   0 0.00 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 0 0.00   0 0.00 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-
MO 
8 0.14   8 1.07 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 40 0.70   25 3.33 
Greensboro-High Point, NC 1 0.02   0 0.00 
Greenville-Anderson-Mauldin, SC 1 0.02   0 0.00 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, 
CT 
88 1.54   26 3.47 
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Table 2. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics of Industry Specialist and Monopolist Auditors 
 
Panel D (Continued): Frequency of SPEC and MONO by MSA 
 
 Audit quality sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 SPEC  MONO 
MSA name Freq. %  Freq. % 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, 
TX 
180 3.16   6 0.80 
Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN 59 1.04   22 2.93 
Jacksonville, FL 14 0.25   4 0.53 
Kansas City, MO-KS 60 1.05   7 0.93 
Knoxville, TN 2 0.04   2 0.27 
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 81 1.42   4 0.53 
Lexington-Fayette, KY 3 0.05   3 0.40 
Little Rock-North Little Rock-
Conway, AR 
1 0.02   0 0.00 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, 
CA 
315 5.53   12 1.60 
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 19 0.33   0 0.00 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 16 0.28   2 0.27 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm 
Beach, FL 
134 2.35   20 2.67 
Midland, MI 10 0.18   10 1.33 
Midland, TX 0 0.00   0 0.00 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 75 1.32   5 0.67 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, 
MN-WI 
131 2.30   19 2.53 
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--
Franklin, TN 
60 1.05   13 1.73 
New Orleans-Metairie, LA 29 0.51   8 1.07 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-
NJ-PA 
293 5.14   2 0.27 
Odessa, TX 3 0.05   3 0.40 
Ogden-Clearfield, UT 10 0.18   7 0.93 
Oklahoma City, OK 6 0.11   0 0.00 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 50 0.88   30 4.00 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 13 0.23   0 0.00 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, 
PA-NJ-DE-MD 
234 4.11   37 4.93 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 84 1.47   9 1.20 
Pittsburgh, PA 112 1.97   0 0.00 
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-
WA 
109 1.91   28 3.73 
Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 2 0.04   0 0.00 
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Table 2. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics of Industry Specialist and Monopolist Auditors 
 
 
Panel A presents the mean and standard deviation of SPEC and MONO for both audit fees and quality 
samples separately. Panel B presents the frequency of SPEC and MONO by audit firms for audit fees and 
quality samples, separately. See Appendix for variable definitions. Panel C (Panel D) presents the frequency 
of SPEC and MONO by two-digit SIC industry (MSA) for audit fees and quality samples, separately. All 
the statistics in this table are based on 20,333 (19,452) firm-year observations for audit fees (audit quality) 
sample. Please see Appendix for variable definitions.
Panel D (Continued): Frequency of SPEC and MONO by MSA 
 
 Audit quality sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 SPEC  MONO 
MSA name Freq. %  Freq. % 
Raleigh, NC 56 0.98   6 0.80 
Reno, NV 2 0.04   2 0.27 
Richmond, VA 24 0.42   1 0.13 
Rochester, NY 32 0.56   4 0.53 
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-
Arcade, CA 
19 0.33   5 0.67 
Salt Lake City, UT 94 1.65   14 1.87 
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 42 0.74   3 0.40 
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 236 4.14   20 2.67 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 213 3.74   31 4.13 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 427 7.50   2 0.27 
San Juan-Carolina-Caguas, PR 10 0.18   10 1.33 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 104 1.83   12 1.60 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 1 0.02   1 0.13 
Spokane-Spokane Valley, WA 17 0.30   0 0.00 
St. Louis, MO-IL 125 2.19   30 4.00 
Syracuse, NY 3 0.05   3 0.40 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 81 1.42   7 0.93 
Toledo, OH 21 0.37   3 0.40 
Trenton, NJ 10 0.18   3 0.40 
Tulsa, OK 50 0.88   16 2.13 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 
DC-VA-MD-WV 
133 2.33   12 1.60 
Wichita, KS 1 0.02   1 0.13 
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LAFEE 13.36 1.47 12.38 13.47 14.35 
SPEC 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MONO 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BIG4 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZE 5.23 2.63 3.68 5.44 7.04 
LEV 0.17 0.28 0.00 0.06 0.25 
ROA –0.58 2.83 –0.18 0.02 0.08 
RECINV 0.24 0.19 0.08 0.20 0.35 
LIQ 12.53 19.96 3.26 6.27 12.74 
LOSS 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ICWEAK 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OFFICESIZE 16.35 2.15 14.85 16.80 18.16 
GC 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BM 0.38 1.18 0.18 0.40 0.71 
NFORGN 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.69 0.69 
NBUSSEG 0.08 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TENURE 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
AF 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LNREPORTLAG 4.27 0.27 4.08 4.26 4.42 
NSPECIALIST 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CHG_AUDID 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DEC_YE 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 
UO 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
PUBLIC_EXC 0.77 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 3. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics 
 
 









RESTATEMENT 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SPEC 0.29 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MONO 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BIG4 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LAGREST 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SIZE 5.56 2.42 4.08 5.68 7.23 
LEV 0.17 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.26 
ICWEAK 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DREC 0.02 0.08 –0.01 0.01 0.03 
LOSS 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MA 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NSPECIALIST 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BM 0.43 1.04 0.20 0.42 0.72 
OFFICESIZE 16.62 2.15 15.16 17.13 18.37 
TENURE 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CHG_AUDID 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PUBLIC_EXC 0.81 0.39 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LNAGE 2.74 0.73 2.20 2.71 3.22 
FIN 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
GROWTH 0.25 0.96 –0.04 0.08 0.26 
LNAFEE 9.93 4.46 9.47 11.28 12.70 
EXTFIND 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CACCR –0.01 0.18 –0.03 0.00 0.04 
AUD_COMP 2.26 1.30 1.00 2.00 3.00 
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Table 3. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel C: Mean difference of audit fees by industry specialist and monopolist auditors 
 
 
 SPEC = 1 SPEC = 1   
 SPEC = 0 & MONO = 0 & MONO = 1   
 (N = 14,841) (N = 4,866) (N = 626) Diff. Diff. 








 BIG4 0.50 0.91 0.78 0.41 –0.13 
SIZE 4.74 6.63 6.09 1.89 –0.54 
LEV 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.02 0.00 
ROA –0.75 –0.10 –0.21 0.65 –0.12 
RECINV 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.01 0.02 
LIQ 12.90 12.12 7.15 –0.78 –4.97 
LOSS 0.48 0.34 0.31 –0.14 –0.03 
ICWEAK 0.15 0.09 0.10 –0.07 0.01 
OFFICESIZE 16.06 17.27 16.22 1.21 –1.05 
GC 0.15 0.04 0.09 –0.11 0.05 
BM 0.35 0.45 0.49 0.10 0.04 
NFORGN 0.36 0.47 0.35 0.10 –0.12 
NBUSSEG 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.07 –0.03 
TENURE 0.37 0.22 0.33 –0.16 0.12 
AF 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.00 0.04 
LNREPORTLA
G 
4.30 4.17 4.20 –0.13 0.02 
NSPECIALIST 0.10 0.37 0.35 0.28 –0.02 
CHG_AUDID 0.12 0.04 0.08 –0.07 0.04 
DEC_YE 0.71 0.77 0.76 0.05 –0.01 
UO 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.00 0.01 
PUBLIC_EXC 0.73 0.91 0.78 0.18 –0.12 
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Table 3. (Continued) Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
The descriptive statistics in Panel A (B) are shown for full sample for audit fees (audit quality) analysis. In 
Panel C (D), the first column presents the mean values of variables for a group of non-industry specialist 
auditors, and the second column presents the statistics for a group of industry specialist but not monopolist 
auditors, and the third column presents the statistics for a group of monopolist auditors. Bivariate test (the 
significance of mean difference) is performed using a t-statistic. Significance at least at the 10% level is 
noted in bold. Please see Appendix for variable definitions.
Panel D: Mean difference of audit quality by industry specialist and monopolist auditors 
 
 
 SPEC = 1 SPEC = 1   
 SPEC = 0 & MONO = 0 & MONO = 1   
 (N = 13,755) (N = 4,947) (N = 750) Diff. Diff. 





0.23 0.02 0.10 
 BIG4 0.54 0.92 0.82 0.38 –0.11 
LAGREST 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.02 0.09 
SIZE 5.07 6.75 6.53 1.68 –0.22 
LEV 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.03 0.00 
ICWEAK 0.14 0.09 0.12 –0.05 0.03 
DREC 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
LOSS 0.45 0.32 0.27 –0.12 –0.05 
MA 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.02 –0.01 
NSPECIALIST 0.10 0.37 0.39 0.27 0.01 
BM 0.41 0.46 0.59 0.05 0.12 
OFFICESIZE 16.35 17.41 16.36 1.06 –1.05 
TENURE 0.35 0.20 0.30 –0.15 0.10 
CHG_AUDID 0.11 0.04 0.05 –0.07 0.01 
PUBLIC_EXC 0.77 0.92 0.82 0.15 –0.10 
LNAGE 2.67 2.90 2.93 0.23 0.03 
FIN 0.59 0.63 0.59 0.04 –0.04 
GROWTH 0.26 0.23 0.19 –0.03 –0.04 
LNAFEE 9.37 11.33 10.96 1.96 –0.37 
EXTFIND 0.19 0.10 0.16 –0.09 0.05 
CACCR –0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 




Table 4. Validating Monopolistic Environment 
 
 
This table presents the estimation results of regressing AVAIL [DIST] on MONO and control variables in 
column (1) [column (2)]. In column (1) [column (2)], industry fixed effects represent division-level [SIC2-
level] industry fixed effects. Please see Appendix for variable definitions. The estimated coefficients are 
presented in the top and the two-sided z-statistics in the brackets at the bottom. Standard errors are clustered 
by audit office and year. *, **, *** denote significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
   
 
 
  Dependent variable (D.V.) = 
   AVAIL    DIST 
Variables  
 (1)    (2) 
Intercept   0.976***    7.876*** 
   (5.836)    (23.760) 
MONO   −0.390***    1.060*** 
   (−7.226)    (15.579) 
MSA_CLIENTS   0.333*** 
   −0.241*** 
 
  (22.264) 
   (−8.563) 
MSA_SIZE   −0.020**    −0.165*** 
   (−2.067)    (−9.739) 
 
  
     




Industry FE   Included   Included 
        
N     20,333 
 
   19,043 
 Pseudo R2     0.064 
 
   0.042 
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 Panel A: Results for audit fees (H1) 
   
 
 
  Dependent variable = LAFEE 
   Full sample    SPEC = 1 only 
Variables   (1) 
   (2) 
Intercept   7.668*** 
   6.867*** 
 
  (45.220) 
   (23.486) 
SPEC (α1)   0.126***    – 
 
 
   (11.641)    – 
MONO (α2)   –0.087*** 
   –0.099*** 
 
  (–3.562) 
   (–4.229) 
BIG4    0.097*** 
   0.241*** 
 
  (5.615) 
   (7.008) 
SIZE   0.433*** 
   0.497*** 
 
  (122.349) 
   (80.983) 
LEV   0.081*** 
   0.038 
 
  (5.147) 
   (1.044) 
ROA   –0.015*** 
   –0.018* 
 
  (–7.439) 
   (–1.955) 
RECINV   0.348*** 
   0.536*** 
 
  (12.944) 
   (9.734) 
LIQ   –0.003*** 
   –0.003*** 
 
  (–15.796) 
   (–6.944) 
LOSS   0.133*** 
   0.136*** 
 
  (15.670) 
   (8.607) 
ICWEAK   0.171*** 
   0.247*** 
 
  (11.499) 
   (7.830) 
OFFICESIZE   0.145*** 
   0.101*** 
 
  (37.567) 
   (15.076) 
GC   0.122*** 
   0.114** 
 
  (6.300) 
   (2.572) 
BM   –0.045*** 
   –0.029*** 
 
  (–10.421) 
   (–2.985) 
NFORGN   0.293*** 
   0.270*** 
 
  (26.505) 
   (12.135) 
NBUSSEG   0.155***    0.109*** 
   (14.145)    (6.414) 
TENURE   –0.001    0.024 
   (–0.087)    (1.346) 
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Panel A (Continued): Results for audit fees (H1) 
   
 
 
  Dependent variable = LAFEE 
   Full sample    SPEC = 1 only 
Variables  
 (1)    (2) 
AF   0.051***    0.022 
   (5.587)    (1.335) 
LNREPORTLAG   0.141***    0.341*** 
   (6.135)    (8.295) 
NSPECIALIST   0.024** 
   0.018 
 
  (2.194) 
   (1.136) 
CHG_AUDID   –0.023    –0.051 
   (–1.375)    (–1.228) 
DEC_YE   0.024*** 
   0.045*** 
 
  (2.786) 
   (2.794) 
UO    –0.097*** 
   –0.054*** 
 
  (–9.449) 
   (–3.211) 
PUBLIC_EXC   0.077*** 
   –0.039 
 
  (6.182) 
   (–1.303) 
 
       




Industry FE   Included   Included 
        
N     20,333 
 
   5,492 
 
Adjusted R2     0.889 
 
   0.868 
 
        
F-Test:        
α1 + α2 = 0    2.71*
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Panel B: Results for audit quality (H2) 
   
 
 
  Dependent variable = AQ 
   Full sample    SPEC = 1 only 
Variables   (1)    (2) 
Intercept   3.169*** 
   3.116** 
 
  (3.224) 
   (2.543) 
SPEC (α1)   0.005    – 
 
 
   (0.062)    – 
MONO (α2)   –0.525*** 
   –0.481*** 
 
  (–3.691) 
   (–2.898) 
BIG4    –0.145 
   –0.237 
 
  (–1.319) 
   (–0.834) 
LAGREST   –3.262*** 
   –3.505*** 
 
  (–50.725) 
   (–28.882) 
SIZE   –0.046** 
   0.067 
 
  (–2.181) 
   (1.568) 
LEV   –0.309** 
   –0.775*** 
 
  (–2.335) 
   (–2.921) 
ICWEAK   –0.327*** 
   –0.325* 
 
  (–3.528) 
   (–1.765) 
DREC   –0.251 
   0.189 
 
  (–0.604) 
   (0.187) 
LOSS   0.008 
   0.120 
 
  (0.113) 
   (0.819) 
MA   –0.383*** 
   –0.288* 
 
  (–4.394) 
   (–1.770) 
NSPECIALIST   –0.163** 
   –0.207* 
 
  (–1.963) 
   (–1.740) 
BM   –0.063* 
   –0.261*** 
 
  (–1.746) 
   (–3.534) 
OFFICESIZE   0.038 
   0.021 
 
  (1.628) 
   (0.515) 
TENURE   0.088 
   –0.128 
 
  (1.106) 
   (–0.843) 
CHG_AUDID   0.461***    0.570 
   (3.448)    (1.498) 
PUBLIC_EXC   0.134    0.258 
   (1.411)    (1.210) 
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This table presents the results from estimating equation (1) in Panel A, and equation (2) in Panel B. For 
both panels, the first column reports the results based on full sample (20,333 observations in Panel A, and 
19,452 observations in Panel B). For Panel B, the full sample contains 19,452 firm-year observations but 
during estimation, this number decreases to 19,398 because observations in small industry clusters drop out 
with the inclusion of industry fixed effects. For both panels, the second column reports the results based on 
sample (5,492 observations in Panel A, and 5,612 observations in Panel B) restricted to industry specialist 
auditors only (SPEC = 1). Please see Appendix for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered by 
audit office and year. The estimated coefficients are presented in the top and the two-sided t-statistics (z-
statistics) in Panel A (Panel B) in the brackets at the bottom. F-test statistics are reported for the results of 
F-tests for the linear combination of α1 and α2. *, **, *** denote significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p 
< 0.01, respectively.
Panel B (Continued): Results for audit quality (H2) 
   
 
 
  Dependent variable = AQ 
   Full sample    SPEC = 1 only 
Variables   (1) 
   (2) 
LNAGE   0.059 
   –0.059 
 
  (1.242) 
   (–0.679) 
FIN   –0.255***    –0.329*** 
   (–4.054)    (–2.888) 
GROWTH   0.041    0.203** 
   (1.105)    (2.075) 
LNAFEE   –0.003    –0.026 
   (–0.315)    (–1.202) 
EXTFIND   0.116    0.374* 
   (1.160)    (1.802) 
CACCR   –0.128 
   0.191 
 
  (–0.567) 
   (0.246) 
AUD_COMP    –0.035 
   –0.024 
 
  (–1.401) 
   (–0.532) 
 
       




Industry FE   Included   Included 
        
N     19,398    5,612 
Pseudo R2     0.322    0.389 
        
F-Test:        
α1 + α2 = 0    –17.39***     
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Table 6. Robustness Tests 
 
 
Panel A: Subsamples of Big 4 and non-Big 4 
    
 
Audit fees sample 
(D.V. = LAFEE) 
 
Audit quality sample 
(D.V. = AQ) 
 Big 4  Non-Big 4  Big 4  Non-Big 4 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept 7.056***  8.228***  3.184***  0.975 
 (40.664)  (35.377)  (2.796)  (1.156) 
SPEC 0.108***  0.178***  –0.014  –0.046 
 (10.550)  (5.937)  (–0.166)  (–0.188) 
MONO –0.052**  –0.315***  –0.533***  –0.691* 
 (–2.214)  (–5.276)  (–3.355)  (–1.685) 
        




 except for 
BIG4 
 except for 
BIG4 
 except for 
BIG4 
Year FE Included  Included  Included  Included 
Industry FE Included  Included  Included  Included 
        




 12,547  6,750 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6. (Continued) Robustness Tests 
  
 
Panel D:  Positive and negative effect of restatement 
  
 Negative vs. Positive effect per  Negative vs. Positive 
 Audit Analytics’ classification  Income effect 
 D.V. =  D.V. = 
 1–NEG_RES 1–POS_RES  1–NEGINC_RES 1–POSINC_RES 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept 3.361*** 5.443***  2.047*** 7.250*** 
 (2.997) (5.003)  (3.343) (7.017) 
SPEC –0.003 –0.074  0.108 –0.097 
 (–0.035) (–0.514)  (1.139) (–0.585) 
MONO –0.456*** –0.835***  –0.760*** –0.807*** 
 (–3.107) (–3.179)  (–4.523) (–2.648) 
      
Controls Included Included  Included Included 
Year FE Included Included  Included Included 
Industry FE Included Included  Included Included 
      
N  19,004 16,900  18,387 16,605 
Pseudo R2 0.317 0.287  0.359 0.336 
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Table 6. (Continued) Robustness Tests 
 
This table presents the results of robustness tests on the main findings. Panel A presents the results from 
estimating equation 1 (equation 2) for Big 4 and non-Big 4 subsamples in column 1 and 2 (column 3 and 
4), respectively. In Panel B, column 1 and 2 [column 4 and 5] present the results from estimating equation 
1 [equation 2] for the size (along with industry and year) matched, and all the covariates (along with 
industry and year) matched samples, respectively. Column 3 [column 6] present the results from estimating 
equation 1 [equation 2] for the MSA size-industry matched sample. The matching procedure follows 
propensity score matching to the closest neighbor without replacement. In Panel C, column 1, 2, and 3 
(column 4, 5, and 6) present the results from estimating equation 1 (equation 2) with additional control 
variable of MSA_IND_SIZE, MSA_SIZE, and MSA_BIG4, respectively, along with MSA fixed effects. In 
Panel D, column 1 (column 2) presents the results from estimating equation 2 with dependent variables of 
one minus negative effect (1-NEG_RES) and positive effect (1-POS_RES) restatement. When a dependent 
variable is 1-NEG_RES (1-POS_RES), positive (negative) effect restatements are deleted. Also, in Panel 
D, column 3 (column 4) presents the results from estimating equation 2 with dependent variables of one 
minus income-decreasing (1-NEGINC_RES) and income-increasing (1-POSINC_RES) restatement. When 
a dependent variable is 1-NEGINC_RES (1-POSINC_RES), income-increasing (income-decreasing) effect 
restatements are deleted. In Panel E, column 1 (column 3) presents the results from estimating equation 1 
(equation 2) with alternative measure of industry specialist auditors, SPEC1, replacing SPEC, while column 
2 (column 4) presents the same results with alternative measure of industry specialist auditors of 
SPEC_ONLY and NISPEC_ONLY, replacing SPEC. Please see Appendix for variable definitions. Standard 
errors are clustered by audit office and year. The estimated coefficients are presented in the top and the 
two-sided t-statistics (z-statistics) in Audit fees sample (Audit quality sample) in the brackets at the bottom. 
*, **, *** denote significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively.
 
  
Panel E: Alternative measures of industry specialist auditors 
  
 
Audit fees sample  
(D.V. = LAFEE) 
 
Audit quality sample 
(D.V. = AQ) 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept 7.701***  7.667***  3.098***  3.104*** 
 (45.571)  (45.292)  (3.156)  (3.154) 
SPEC1 0.122***  – 
 
 0.021  – 
 
 (11.916)  – 
 



















 (–9.552)  – 
 
 (0.541) 
MONO –0.081***  –0.093***  –0.598***  –0.586*** 
 (–3.364)  (–3.839)  (–4.264)  (–4.140) 
        
Controls Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year FE Included  Included  Included  Included 
Industry FE Included  Included  Included  Included 
        
N  20,333  20,333  19,497  19,497 








 0.326  0.326 
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Table 7. Placebo Tests 
 
 
This table presents the results of placebo tests on the main findings. Columns 1 and 2 [columns 3 and 4] 
present the results from estimating equation 1 (equation 2) with P_MONO1 and P_MONO2, respectively. 
Please see Appendix for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered by audit office and year. The 
estimated coefficients are presented in the top and the two-sided t-statistics (z-statistics) in Audit fees 
sample (Audit quality sample) in the brackets at the bottom. *, **, *** denote significance at p < 0.10, p < 
0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively.
   
 
Audit fees sample  
(D.V. = LAFEE) 
 
Audit quality sample 
(D.V. = AQ) 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept 7.763***  7.769***  2.751***  2.764*** 
 (46.120)  (46.161)  (2.804)  (2.816) 
SPEC 0.127***  0.131***  –0.017  –0.002 
 (11.225)  (11.379)  (–0.215)  (–0.024) 
P_MONO1 0.024  – 
 
 –0.069  – 
 
 (1.265)  – 
 









 (–0.007)  –
 
 (–0.300) 
       
Controls Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year FE Included  Included  Included  Included 
Industry FE Included  Included  Included  Included 
        
N  19,722  19,722  18,654  18,654 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This table presents cross-sectional tests for audit fees (audit quality) analysis in Panel A (Panel B). Panel 
A presents the results from estimating equation 1 for subsamples split on HGEN (column 1 through 4), and 
COMPLEX (column 5 through 8). Column 1 and 2 (column 3 and 4) report the estimation results of equation 
1 without (with) MONO on subsamples of non-homogenous and homogenous industry, respectively. In 
addition, column 5 and 6 (column 7 and 8) report the estimation results of equation 1 without (with) MONO 
on subsamples of non-complex and complex industry, respectively. Panel B presents the results from 
estimating equation 2 for subsample split on LOWCOMP. Column 1 reports the estimation results of 
equation 2 with a dependent variable of 1-GAAP related restatement. GAAP related restatement defines 
RESTATEMENT as one if restatement is due to misapplication of GAAP, and 0 otherwise. Column 2 and 
3 (column 4 and 5) report the estimation results of equation 2 on subsamples of low and high competition 
MSA, respectively, with a dependent variable of 1-GAAP related restatement (all restatement). Please see 
Appendix for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered by audit office and year. The estimated 
coefficients are presented in the top and the two-sided t-statistics (z-statistics) in Panel A (Panel B) in the 
brackets at the bottom. *, **, *** denote significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively
Table 8 (Continued) Cross-Sectional Tests 
 
  
Panel B:  Cross-sectional tests for restatement analysis 
  
 D.V. = 
D.V. = 1–GAAP related 
Restatement 




LOWCOMP =  LOWCOMP = 
 Restatement 0 1  0 1 
Variables (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Intercept 2.832*** 2.062** 3.158**  2.644*** 3.097*** 
 (2.867) (2.044) (2.475) 
 
(2.640) (2.746) 












 (–2.058) – –  – – 
SPEC –0.022 –0.042 0.087 
 
–0.028 0.135 
 (–0.271) (–0.471) (0.433) 
 
(–0.331) (0.731) 
MONO –0.350** –0.055 –0.956*** 
 
–0.184 –1.121*** 
 (–2.146) (–0.246) (–3.369) 
 
(–0.894) (–4.690) 
       
Controls Included Included Included  Included Included 
  except for except for  except for except for 
  AUD_COMP AUD_COMP  AUD_COMP AUD_COMP 
Year FE Included Included Included  Included Included 
Industry FE Included Included Included  Included Included 
       
N  18,944 15,716 3,245  16,064 3,351 
Pseudo R2 0.303 0.307 0.342  0.322 0.363 
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Table 9. Effect of Economies of Scale 
 
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation 1 separately for subsamples of city-industry markets 
with two clients (column 1, HNUM = 0); with more than two clients in city-industry market (column 2, 
HNUM = 1). Also, column 3 and 4 present the results from estimating equation 1 separately for below 
median of the ranked number of clients per auditor in city-industry market (HSCALE = 0) and above median 
of the ranked number of clients per auditor in city-industry market (HSCALE = 1), respectively. Please see 
Appendix for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered by audit office and year. The estimated 
coefficients are presented in the top and the two-sided t-statistics in the brackets at the bottom. *, **, *** 
denote significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively
   
 D.V. = LAFEE 
 Based on Number of Clients  Based on SCALE 
 HNUM = 0  HNUM = 1  HSCALE = 0  HSCALE = 1 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept 7.772***  7.598***  8.053***  6.874*** 
 (15.378)  (44.152)  (65.311)  (44.200) 
SPEC 0.239***  0.127***  0.209***  0.068*** 
 (8.805)  (11.410)  (16.131)  (5.008) 
MONO –0.127***  –0.153***  –0.131***  –0.079** 
 (–4.165)  (–3.552)  (–4.722)  (–2.047) 
        
Controls Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year FE Included  Included  Included  Included 
Industry FE Included  Included  Included  Included 
        
N  2,200  18,133  10,927  9,422 
Adjusted R2 0.894  0.890  0.894  0.880 
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Table 10. Path Analysis 
 
 
This table summarizes the path analysis estimates of the relation between monopolist auditors (MONO) 
and audit quality (AQ) using audit fees (LAFEE) as a path. The estimation is based on a structural equation 
model to determine the direct effects of MONO on AQ, as well as indirect effects MONO on AQ via LAFEE. 
All the coefficients are standardized. All the control variables in equation (1) and (2) are included. The 
significance of the indirect effects is assessed using Sobel (1982) test. Test statistics for direct effects are 
two-sided t-statistics, while the rest of test statistics are two-sided z-statistics. *, **, *** denote significance 
at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. Please see Appendix for variable definitions.
Outcome Variable = AQ  
 
 
Mediating Variable = LAFEE  Coefficient    Test statistic 
Direct Effects of Monopolist 
Auditors 
       
MONO   –0.055***    –4.95 
        
Direct Effects of Mediating Variable        
I. LAFEE   0.011***    2.69 
        
Mediating Path        
II. Path (MONO, LAFEE)   −0.056***    −2.82 
        
Indirect Effects        
MONO (I x II)   –0.001*    –1.95 
        
Total Effects (Direct + Indirect)        
MONO   –0.055***    –4.95 
        
% Effect Mediated        
MONO   1.1% 
        
Controls   Included 
Year FE   Included 
Industry FE   Included 
N   19,681 
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Table 11. Effect of Auditors’ Market Share Increments 
 
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1) in the first column, and equation (2) in the 
second column, replacing SPEC with SPECD1 through SPECD10. Please see Appendix for variable 
definitions. Standard errors are clustered by audit office and year. The estimated coefficients are presented 
in the top and the two-sided t-statistics (z-statistics) in the first column (second column) in the brackets at 
the bottom. *, **, *** denote significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
    
 
 
  Dependent variable =  
   LAFEE    AQ 
Variables   (1) 
   (2) 
Intercept   7.739*** 
   3.036*** 
 
  (46.015) 
   (3.090) 
SPECD1   0.049**    –0.230 
   (2.348)    (–1.584) 
SPECD2   0.045*    0.043 
   (1.651)    (0.223) 
SPECD3   −0.019    0.258 
   (−0.565)    (1.187) 
SPECD4   0.033    0.005 
   (0.919)    (0.019) 
SPECD5   −0.026 
   0.007 
 
  (−0.758) 
   (0.025) 
SPECD6   0.068** 
   –0.160 
 
  (1.975) 
   (–0.586) 
SPECD7   −0.043    0.237 
   (−1.164)    (0.941) 
SPECD8   0.096**    0.002 
 
  (2.417)    (0.008) 
SPECD9   0.069*    0.136 
   (1.787)    (0.487) 
SPECD10   0.029    –0.441 
   (0.709)    (–1.613) 
MONO   −0.255***    –0.433* 
   (−6.341)    (–1.835) 
        
Controls   Included    Included 




Industry FE   Included   Included 
        
N     20,333    19,398 
Adjusted R2   0.889    − 
Pseudo R2     −    0.326 
